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CROSS-BORDER REINCORPORATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
THE CASE FOR COMPREHENSIVE HARMONISATION 
Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, Federico M. Mucciarelli, Edmund Schuster and Mathias Siems 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract. This article compares the legal frameworks for corporate reincorporations of all EU 
Member States, relying on a Study prepared by the authors for the European Commission and 
accompanied by detailed national reports. It is shown that, despite recent decisions of the Court 
of Justice that liberalise inbound and outbound reincorporations, several Member States still 
prohibit these transactions or make them impossible or impractical. Even where 
reincorporations are available in principle, significant legal uncertainties often exist due to a 
lack of clear and interoperable rules. This situation may for instance jeopardise the interests of 
creditors and minority shareholders of the emigrating companies in circumstances where the 
involved jurisdictions do not provide for an explicit regulation of cross-border reincorporations 
aimed at protecting these stakeholders. Furthermore, when procedural rules are unclear or 
lacking, companies might be struck from the relevant register of the country of origin without 
being entered in the register of any other Member States. We argue that, as a consequence, 
harmonisation of the reincorporation process is necessary, and that it is desirable to reach a 
high minimum standard of creditor and minority shareholder protection and define clear rules 
for the cancellation of companies from the domestic register.  
 
Keywords: reincorporations, freedom of establishment, corporate mobility, comparative com-
pany law, Court of Justice of the European Union  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Companies incorporated under the law of a Member State may seek to subject themselves to 
another Member State’s law without going through the process of liquidation in their original 
jurisdiction. Such operations are usually labelled ‘cross-border reincorporations’, or just ‘re-
incorporations’. In the European Union, companies can pursue this goal either indirectly by 
way of a cross-border merger, or by using the vehicle of a Societas Europaea. Furthermore, 
recent decisions of the Court of Justice indicate that companies incorporated in a Member State 
should be allowed, in certain circumstances that will be discussed in detail later, to change the 
applicable company law without being forced into liquidation. Despite these decisions, how-
ever, the issue of whether and to what extent freedom of establishment also covers cross-border 
reincorporations is still partially uncertain and, as a matter of fact, several Member States still 
effectively restrict or even outright prohibit these transactions.1  
Even where both Member States concerned do allow reincorporations, a company can only 
change its applicable company law if both the country of origin and the country of destination 
address this type of transaction in their national laws and the company complies with the sub-
stantive laws of both countries.2 The need to comply with rules and principles of two jurisdic-
tions can give rise to significant practical problems. Indeed, reincorporation requirements vary 
widely across Member States, most of which have traditionally rendered such transactions ex-
tremely difficult. In part, the difficulties can be explained in political terms, as Member States’ 
legislators often regard company law as a device for protecting a wide range of corporate con-
stituencies rather than merely addressing the shareholder-director relationship. The new appli-
cable company law may be less protective of creditors, other stakeholders or minority share-
holders than the law of the country of origin – or, at least, the country of origin may consider 
this to be the case. Consequently, a reincorporation might be harmful for these ‘weak constit-
uencies’ and companies might exploit such differences opportunistically, unless other legal 
mechanisms are in place to protect them. In this regard, it is also necessary to stress that the 
regulatory limits to reincorporations restrict the company’s capacity of changing the applicable 
law after its formation. These rules, therefore, are key elements of regulatory competition in 
company law.  
Cross-border reincorporations have been addressed in various scholarly studies.3 The present 
work will add to previous studies a comparative analysis of all Member States of the European 
                                                 
1 For references and details see section 3.1., below, regarding cross-border mergers and SEs, and section 4 and 5 
regarding the laws of the Member States. 
2 However, compliance with the rules of the country of departure is only required insofar as they do not constitute 
restrictions of the freedom of establishment, or else are justified. See e.g. C-371/10 National Grid Indus BV v 
Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Rijnmond/kantoor Rotterdam, ECLI:EU:C:2011:785. 
3  Literature on EU freedom of establishment and companies’ private international law is boundless and a 
comprehensive overview is nearly impossible. With reference to publications in English addressing exclusively 
cross-border reincorporations in the EU, see e.g. T Biermeyer, Stakeholder Protection in Cross-Border Seat 
Transfers in the EU (WLP 2015); WG Ringe, ‘No freedom of Emigration for Companies?’ (2005) 16 European 
Business Law Review 621; E Wymeersch, ‘The Transfer of the Company’s Seat in European Company Law’ 
(2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 661; KE Sørensen and M Neville, ‘Corporate Migration in the European 
Union: An Analysis of the Proposed 14th EC Company Law Directive on the Transfer of the Registered Office 
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Union regarding rules on transfer of a company’s registered office and cross-border reincorpo-
rations. The research underlying this article was carried out as part of a ‘Study on the law 
applicable to companies’, prepared by the authors of this article for the European Commission 
(DG Justice), which also comprises detailed country reports for all 28 Member States drafted 
by local experts based on a common template.4 Eventually, this article will outline how the 
system may develop in the future.  
The article is structured as follows: Section 2 will address the policy issues arising from deci-
sions of changing applicable law. Section 3 depicts the current ‘state of the art’ regarding cross-
border change of applicable company law: current possibilities to reincorporate throughout the 
EU and the case law of the Court of Justice. Sections 4 and 5 will compare and contrast the 
regimes of Member States related to ‘outbound’ and ‘inbound’ voluntary reincorporations. It 
will be shown that, even after the most recent case law of the Court of Justice on freedom of 
establishment, these national regimes still keep significant differences with regard to the pos-
sibility of domestic companies to change the applicable law without liquidation as well as re-
garding foreign companies who aim at converting into a domestic entity. Section 6 will then 
analyse a recent submission for preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice regarding a national 
ban of outbound reincorporations; here, we also argue that judicial decisions are not sufficient 
to create a coherent and workable system that allows reincorporations, without neglecting the 
interests of other stakeholders, and that EU harmonisation is needed. The final Section 7 con-
cludes by summarising the results and it stresses that comprehensive harmonisation is the best 
option. 
 
2. CONCEPTUAL AND POLICY ISSUES RAISED BY CROSS-BORDER REINCORPORATIONS 
The very existence of a legal person separate from its members, and the corresponding benefit 
of limited liability that shareholders enjoy, stems from rules of the specific legal system ac-
cording to which a company was created. 5 In the words of the Court of Justice, ‘companies are 
creatures of the law and, in the present state of Community law, creatures of national law’.6  
However, companies originally incorporated in a certain jurisdiction may seek to change their 
status and ‘convert’ into a company type governed by another jurisdiction. Such an operation 
can of course only be described as a ‘reincorporation’ where no liquidation is required in the 
original country of incorporation. It leads to an alteration of the company law to which the 
                                                 
of a Company From one Member State to Another with a Change of Applicable Law’ (2000) 6 Columbia Journal 
of European Law 191; RR Drury, ‘Migrating Companies’ (1999) 24 European Law Review 362. 
4 The main report of the Study on the Law Applicable to Companies: Final Report (June 2016) is available at 
https://dx.doi.org/10.2838/527231. The question of reincorporations is one of the topics addressed in the country 
reports of this study, thus forming the basis of the comparative analysis of the present article. These country 
reports will be published separately. 
5 See e.g. P Ireland, ‘Limited Liability, Shareholder Rights and the Problem of Corporate Irresponsibility’ (2010) 
34 Cambridge Journal of Economics 837; MV Benedettelli, ‘Five Lay Commandments for the EU Private 
International Law of Companies’ (2015/2016) 17 Yearbook of Private International Law 209, 216. 
6 C-81/87, The Queen v HM Treasury and Commissioners for Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and General 
Trust plc [1988] ECR 5483, at [19]. 
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reincorporating company is subject, while not – at least not directly – affecting the company’s 
operations, including the place where productive factors are situated. Reincorporations are sim-
ilar to domestic conversions of a company into another company type,7 but differ insofar as 
domestic conversions do not alter the State that has the power to adopt and amend the govern-
ing rules. In this respect, it is also necessary to highlight that such a shift of rule-making power 
only concerns issues that are characterised as ‘company law’ for private international law pur-
poses (lex societatis), also considering that EU law places certain limits on the characterisation 
by Member States.8  
In order for a reincorporation to be successful, the State of arrival should register the company 
into its domestic commercial register as a continuation of the formerly existing company. This 
shift of registration, if allowed, is normally triggered by a decision taken by the company to 
alter the clause in its articles of association indicating its ‘registered office’ or ‘statutory seat’. 
Courts and national registers, however, should additionally inquire whether the real intention 
of the company was to also change the applicable company law. 9 Such an intention may be 
presumed when the company has approved a shift of its registered office or statutory seat. In 
this regard, it is worth briefly shedding light on the terms ‘statutory seat’ and ‘registered office’. 
Although these terms are almost invariably used interchangeably in scholarly articles and in 
most EU legislative materials10, they might refer to different concepts in different jurisdictions. 
In particular, the concept of ‘registered office’ derives from UK law and refers to the place 
filed with the Companies House11, where documents may be served and kept for inspection.12 
The concept of ‘statutory seat’, by contrast, refers to a place mentioned in the articles of asso-
ciation, which is normally located in the same country where the company is registered.13 Con-
sequently, in jurisdictions that adopt the concept of ‘statutory seat’, companies, at least in the-
                                                 
7 For instance conversion of, or re-registration by, a private limited company as public limited company. 
8 C Gerner-Beuerle and EP Schuster, ‘The Costs of Separation: Conflicts in Company and Insolvency Law in 
Europe’ (2014) 14 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 287, 321. See also Bendettelli (n 5) 225-32 (stressing that, 
when EU legislative instruments are silent regarding characterisation, the risk of a negative or a positive conflict 
of law can arise). 
9 MV Benedettelli, ‘Sul trasferimento della sede sociale all’estero’ (2010) 55 Rivista delle Società 1251, 1265. 
10 See, however, Brussels I Regulation on jurisdiction (recast), 2012, whose art. 63 maintains that a company is 
domiciled, among other factors, at the place where it has its statutory seat, and that in Ireland, Cyprus and the 
United Kingdom, ‘statutory seat’ means a company’s registered office.  
11 Companies Act 2006 s. 9(2)(b). See D Prentice, ‘The Incorporation Theory – The United Kingdom’ (2003) 14 
European Business Law Review 1. 
12 Companies Act 2006, s. 1136 and s. 1139(1). 
13 J Rickford, ‘Current Development in European Law on Restructuring of Companies: An Introduction’ (2004) 
15 European Business Law Review 1229; J von Hein, ‘Zur Kodification des europäischen Übernahmekolli-
sionsrechts’ (2005) Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 545. See First Council Directive 68/151/EEC of 9 March 
1968 on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required 
by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Art. 58 of the Treaty, with a view 
to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community, as amended (now recast as Directive 
2009/101/EC), which requires the presence of a ‘registered office’ in the Member State of registration.  
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ory, could be allowed to amend the clause of their articles of association indicating their ‘stat-
utory seat’ without necessarily changing their registration and the applicable law, if they so 
wish.14 
As a consequence, in this article we define reincorporation as a transaction in which a company 
decides to voluntarily change the applicable company law to which it is subject and intends to 
do so without going through the liquidation process in the country of incorporation. Such rein-
corporations may or may not entail a relocation of the company’s ‘headquarters’, or ‘central 
administration’ or any other physical elements of the company’s business. 
At firm level, from the perspective of shareholders, cross-border reincorporations should aim 
at attaining efficiency gains due to the application of a more suitable company law. A change 
of the applicable company law will typically result in a number of significant changes for 
shareholders and directors of the company. For instance, majority requirements, the balance of 
powers between shareholders and the board, directors’ liability, the structure of the board, as 
well as rules limiting departures from the ‘one-share-one-vote’ default rule will change as a 
result of this operation.  
All national company laws in the EU, however, go beyond just regulating the relationship be-
tween shareholders and directors: they also contain (partly harmonised) mandatory rules for 
the protection of creditors and other stakeholders, and often also try to address other potential 
negative externalities. Typical examples of company law rules that aim at protecting creditors 
are rules on capital formation, limits to dividends and prohibitions of disguised distributions, 
directors’ duties in the vicinity of insolvency15 or participation rights of employees in the com-
pany’s decision-making bodies (‘codetermination’).16 A decision to reincorporate from one ju-
risdiction to another will negatively affect creditors or other stakeholders under two conditions: 
(a) the rules aiming at protecting these stakeholders fall within the scope of ‘company law’ in 
the Member State of origin and the destination Member State; (b) the company law regime of 
the new jurisdiction is less protective than the original lex societatis. Alternatively, protection 
deficits may also arise if the legal mechanism protecting creditors or other stakeholders is pre-
sent in the laws of both Member States, but the international scope of application of the mech-
anisms is determined according to different connecting factors. If, for instance, a jurisdiction 
relies exclusively or mostly on company law rules to protect creditors and other stakeholders, 
rather than addressing these issues through insolvency or tort law, moving the statutory seat, 
but not the real seat, to another jurisdiction that uses predominantly the latter strategies to ad-
dress the same underlying problems could be detrimental.17 Importantly, in this example, the 
detrimental effect may not depend on differences in the absolute level of protection afforded 
                                                 
14  See e.g. H Eidenmüller, ‘Mobilität und Restrukturierung von Unternehmen im Binnenmarkt’ (2004) 
Juristenzeitung 32; S Lombardo, ‘Libertà di stabilimento e mobilità delle società in Europa’ (2005) Nuova 
giurisprudenza civile commentata 372. 
15  See e.g. L Enriques and M Gelter, ‘Regulatory Competition in European Company Law and Creditor 
Protection’ (2006) 7 European Business Organization Law Review 417, 422-35. For a comparison of the English 
and the German regimes on capital maintenance T Bachner, Creditor Protection in Private Companies 
(Cambridge University Press 2009) 115.  
16 For an overview of workers participation regimes in EU Member States see www.worker-participation.eu.  
17 For more details, see the discussion in Gerner-Beuerle and Schuster (n 8). 
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to different corporate constituencies. Thus, the fact that significant differences exist between 
company laws across the EU may give rise to regulatory arbitrage and, potentially, to regula-
tory competition among jurisdictions, as companies seek to become subject to the legal regime 
least burdensome to them, given the specific situation they are in. In the absence of legal rules 
addressing this potential problem, reincorporations may pose a significant risk to stakeholders, 
as companies may act in opportunistic ways when deciding to change the law by which they – 
and their relationships with third parties – are governed. 
Apart from a change of the applicable company law, reincorporations may also have a number 
of additional effects. First of all, according to the Insolvency Regulation, reincorporations also 
lead to a change of the competent insolvency venue and the applicable insolvency regime, 
unless creditors provide evidence that the company’s centre of main interests (‘COMI’) is still 
in the country of origin.18 Furthermore, a relocation of the registered office might lead to a shift 
of the competent jurisdiction in civil cases to the country of arrival.19 Therefore, although 
shareholders may attain efficiency gains through the application of a more suitable company 
law, reincorporations may also harm creditors and other stakeholders when the newly applica-
ble rules are less protective than the original ones.  
 
3. STATE OF THE ART IN THE EU 
3.1. Current possibilities to reincorporate 
Companies incorporated in a Member State of the EU can effectively change the applicable 
company law regime, without liquidation, by converting into, or otherwise forming a European 
Company (Societas Europaea, hereinafter ‘SE’),20 or by implementing a cross-border mer-
ger.21  
The SE Regulation only provides a general regulatory framework for SEs, which are mostly 
governed by the regime for public companies of the Member State where their registered office 
                                                 
18 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency 
proceedings, OJ L141/19 (hereinafter the ‘Insolvency Regulation Recast’), art. 3(1). 
19 See Brussels I Regulation Recast, Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012, art. 63. The Brussels I Regulation also grants 
exclusive jurisdiction to the state of a company’s ‘seat’, but only with regard to some subject matters. The same 
article also maintains that ‘[i]n order to determine that seat, the court shall apply its rules of private international 
law’, with the consequence that if both countries follows the idea that a company’s seat is its registered office, a 
transfer of the latter would lead to a shift of jurisdiction; see Brussels I Regulation (recast) art. 24(2). On 
jurisdictional issues see MV Benedettelli, ‘Conflicts of Jurisdiction and Conflicts of Law in Company Law 
Matters Within the EU “Market for Corporate Models”: Brussels I and Rome I after Centros’ (2005) 16 European 
Business Law Review 55, 61-3. 
20  Regulation of the Council 2157/2001/EC of 8 October 2001 on the statute of the European Company 
(hereinafter, the ‘SE Regulation’). 
21 Under the national rules implementing Directive 2005/56/EC [2005] OJ L 310/1. 
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is situated.22 SEs can relocate their registered office from one Member State to any other coun-
try of the European Economic Area,23 provided that their registered office is located in the 
same Member State where their head office is situated.24 Therefore, the SE is not a vehicle for 
free (or ‘pure’) choice of law, for an SE must always transfer its head office together with its 
registered office from one jurisdiction to another. SEs, however, can only be incorporated by 
pre-existing public companies in specific circumstances, which are detailed in the SE Regula-
tion and whose common denominator is the existence of a cross-border connection.25 Meeting 
these formal requirements will often require additional reorganisations, thereby increasing 
transaction costs. 
Companies incorporated in an EU Member State may also make use of cross-border mergers 
to achieve effects equivalent to a reincorporation.26 Such de facto reincorporations are imple-
mented by founding a new ‘shell’ company in another Member State (usually a wholly-owned 
subsidiary), and then merging into the newly formed foreign company. Cross-border mergers 
of this type can now be implemented under a common procedural framework,27 which has led 
to a significant simplification of these transactions. This transaction, in addition, is typically 
tax neutral, as are national mergers in most cases.28 However, the procedure for reincorpora-
tions using a cross-border merger can be relatively time-consuming and costly, depending on 
the legislation of the Member States involved and due to the absence of a ‘fast-track proce-
dure’,29 in particular when the only aim of a cross-border merger is relocating the company’s 
registered office, without implementing a real integration between different companies.  
 
3.2. Summary of case law of the Court of Justice  
The main question of whether cross-border reincorporations, by way of relocating the regis-
tered office, are covered by the freedom of establishment remains unresolved. First, the ques-
tion arises of whether the freedom of establishment requires Member States to allow domestic 
companies to reincorporate in another Member State without forcing them to liquidate. The 
                                                 
22 SE Regulation, art. 9(1). See e.g. J Rickford, ‘The European Company’ in J Rickford (ed) The European 
Company: Developing a Community Law of Corporations (Intersentia 2003) ch 2. 
23 SE Regulation, art. 8. The SE Regulation also applies to EEA countries that are not Member States of the EU 
(Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway): art. 77 and annex XXII EEA Agreement. 
24 SE Regulation, art. 7. On this see e.g. WG Ringe, ‘The European Company Statute in the Context of Freedom 
of Establishment’ (2007) 7 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 185, 186-91. 
25 SE Regulation, art. 2. 
26 Reincorporations in the US are also typically implemented through cross-state mergers; see e.g. Model Business 
Corporation Act Ann. § 11.02 (1984). 
27 Directive 2005/56/EC of the Parliament and the Council of 26 October 2005 on cross-border mergers of limited 
liability companies (hereinafter, the ‘Cross-Border Merger Directive’). See also M Siems, ‘The European 
Directive on Cross-Border Mergers: An International Model?’ (2004-2005) 11 Columbia Journal of European 
Law 167. 
28 See Directive 90/434/EEC on a common system of taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets 
and exchanges of shares concerning companies of different Member States, as amended by Directive 2005/19/EC. 
29 See Becht-Bruun & Lexidale, Study on the Application of the Cross-Border Merger Directive (2013) at pp. 36 
and 112; J Schmidt ‘Cross-Border Mergers and Divisions, Transfers of Seat: Is There a Need to Legislate?’, Study 
for the JURI committee (Legal Affairs) of the European Parliament (2016) at pp. 32-3. 
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second question is whether companies incorporated in another Member State have a right to 
incorporate as domestic companies, without the need to liquidate and with full continuity of 
their rights and duties. In both cases, the overarching questions arise of whether the involved 
Member States can require the ‘emigrating’ companies to also relocate their head office or 
other physical elements into the country of arrival.  
In recent years, the Court of Justice has gradually clarified its case law in order to favour mo-
bility, although the present situation is still partially ambiguous. In Daily Mail,30 the European 
Court of Justice addressed the restrictions placed by the UK on the relocation of a domestic 
company’s administrative seat and tax domicile to the Netherlands. The ECJ held that such a 
restriction was not in violation of the freedom of establishment. The Court based its opinion 
on a general assumption regarding the relationship between a company and its state of incor-
poration. In particular, it was maintained that ‘unlike natural persons, companies are creatures 
of the law and, in the present state of Community law, creatures of national law. They exist 
only by virtue of the varying national legislation which determines their incorporation and 
functioning’.31 As a consequence, the ECJ concluded that the freedom of establishment ‘cannot 
be interpreted as conferring on companies incorporated under the law of a Member State a right 
to transfer their central management and control and their central administration to another 
Member State while retaining their status as companies incorporated under the legislation of 
the first Member State.’32 At a closer look, however, Daily Mail reveals several ambiguities. 
This decision only concerned the outbound relocation of a company’s tax residence, not out-
bound reincorporations (which, as we shall see, are impossible out of the UK).33 Additionally, 
the ECJ also emphasised that the freedom of establishment ‘prohibits the Member State of 
origin from hindering the establishment in another Member State of one of its nationals or of a 
company incorporated under its legislation’.34  
The Court of Justice partially clarified these issues in the more recent decisions Cartesio35 and 
VALE. The decision rendered in the case Cartesio was related to a Hungarian company that 
                                                 
30 Daily Mail (n 6) 
31 Daily Mail (n 6) [19]. 
32 Daily Mail (n 6) [24]. This was confirmed in C-208/00 Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company 
Baumanagement GmbH [2002] ECR I-9919 (ECLI:EU:C:2002:632) [61–72] and C-167/01 Kamer van 
Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art [2003] ECR I-1095 (ECLI:EU:C:2003:512) [102], 
distinguishing Daily Mail from the cases that were under review on the basis of the fact that the restrictions at 
issue concerned ‘moving-in’ scenarios, whereas Daily Mail was only related to moving-out situations: See e.g. U 
Forsthoff, in H Hirte and T Bücker (eds.) Grenzüberschreitende Gesellschaften (Carl Heymanns 2005) 57. 
33 See S Lombardo, ‘Conflict of Law Rules in Company Law after Überseering: An Economic and Comparative 
Analysis of the Allocation of Policy Competence in the European Union’ (2003) 3 European Business 
Organization Law Review 301, 306; FM Mucciarelli, ‘Company “Emigration” and EC Freedom of Establishment: 
Daily Mail revisited’ (2008) 9 European Business Organization Law Review 268, 295. 
34 Daily Mail (n 6) [16]. Confirmed in C-264/96 Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) v. Kenneth Hall Colmer 
(HM Inspector of Taxes) [1998] ECR I-4695; C-9/02 Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Ministère de l’Économie, 
des Finances et de l’Industrie [2004] ECR I-2409; C-446/03 Marks & Spencer plc v. David Halsey (Her Majesty’s 
Inspector of Taxes) [2005] ECR I-10837. 
35 C-210/06 Cartesio Oktato es Szolgaltato bt [2008] ECR I-9641 (ECLI:EU:C:2008:723). See also J Borg-
Barthet, ‘Free at Last? Choice of Corporate Law in the EU Following the Judgment in Vale’ (2013) 62 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 503; A Baert, ‘Crossing Borders: Exploring the Need for a 
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intended to transfer its ‘seat’ (székhely) to Italy, while continuing to be governed by Hungarian 
law as lex societatis. According to Hungarian substantive rules in force at the time when Car-
tesio sought to transfer its ‘seat’ abroad, a company’s headquarters could not be detached from 
its registered office, with the consequence that Cartesio was also compelled to be removed 
from the Hungarian register even though it did not seek to change the applicable company 
law.36 The Court concluded that ‘a Member State has the power to define […] the connecting 
factor required’ for a company to be incorporated under its law,37 and thus being capable of 
enjoying the right of establishment, and the criteria for continuing to maintain that status.38 
That included, in continuity with Daily Mail, the power ‘not to permit a company governed by 
its law to retain that status if the company intends to reorganise itself in another Member State 
by moving its seat’ there, ‘thereby breaking the connecting factor required under the national 
law of the Member State of incorporation’.39 Importantly, however, the Court also explains40 
that this power does not include the capacity to impede a ‘conversion’ into a company governed 
by the law of a new Member State. Rather, the freedom of establishment gives the right, as 
against the Member State of origin, to reincorporate a company abroad, so that any restriction 
to voluntary outbound reincorporations must be justified by overriding reasons in the public 
interest.41 In particular, the Court views liquidation requirements for companies reincorporat-
ing abroad as (generally) disproportionate restrictions. However, the Court’s statement in Car-
tesio was not directly relevant to the case decided, and thus constitutes a mere obiter dictum.42 
                                                 
Fourteenth EU Company Law Directive on the Transfer of the Registered Office’ (2015) 26 European Business 
Law Review 581, 597. 
36 Act CXLV of 1997 on the Register of Companies, Public Company Information and Court Registration 
Proceedings, art. 16(1). See now: Act on Firm Information, Firm Registration and Voluntary Liquidation 
Proceedings, 2006, s. 7(b). It is worth mentioning that Hungarian conflict of law rules for companies are based 
upon the incorporation theory: Statutory Rule No. 13 of 1979 on Private International Law, art. 18. See also V 
Korom and P Metzinger, ‘Freedom of Establishment for Companies: The European Court of Justice Confirms 
and Refines its Daily Mail Decision in the Cartesio Case C-210/06’ (2009) 6 European Company and Financial 
Law Review 144. 
37 Cartesio (n 35) [110]. However, despite the fact that the Court of Justice seems to consider them as connecting 
factors (see Cartesio at para. 108), the three criteria mentioned in art. 54 TFEU (registered office, central 
administration and principal place of business) are rather elements that companies should have on the territory of 
the EU in order to enjoy freedom of establishment (under the implicit assumption that these companies have been 
validly formed under the law of a Member State). See Benedettelli (n 5) 220; S Lombardo, ‘Regulatory 
Competition in Company Law in the European Union after Cartesio’ (2009) 10 European Business Organization 
Law Review 628; Korom and Metzinger (n 36) 149; C Teichmann, ‘Cartesio: Die Freiheit zum Formwechselden 
Wegzug’ (2009) Zeitschrift für Wirstschaftsrecht 393, 400; D Dashwood and others, Wyatt and Dashwood’s 
European Union Law (Hart 2011) 648; R Schütze, European Union Law (Cambridge University Press 2015) 611. 
38 Cartesio (n 35) [110]. 
39 Cartesio (n 35) [110]. See Korom and Metzinger (n 36) 159; J Armour and WG Ringe, ‘European Company 
Law 1999-2010: Renaissance and Crisis’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 125, 140. 
40 Cartesio (n 35) [111–113]. On the distinction between outbound reincorporations (included in the EU freedom 
of establishment) and cases in which a company relocates some relevant factors out of the state of origin without 
seeking a reincorporation (not included) see S Lombardo (n 37) 638; C Gerner-Beuerle and M Schilling, ‘The 
Mysteries of Freedom of Establishment after Cartesio’ (2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
303, 311 (stressing the ambiguities of the Cartesio decision); P Paschalidis, Freedom of Establishment and Private 
International Law for Corporations (Oxford University Press 2012) 82. 
41 Cartesio (n 35) [113]. 
42 See Opinion of AG Kokott C-106/16 Polbud v Wykonawstwo sp. z.o.o., 4 May 2017 (ECLI:EU:C:2017:351) 
[40]. 
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The Cartesio ruling, therefore, does not seem to provide conclusive answers to the question of 
whether Member States must allow domestic companies to reincorporate abroad or, at least, it 
may be debated whether this part of the Cartesio ruling is directly binding or not. 
Furthermore, in the decision VALE43, the Court of Justice addressed the case of an Italian pri-
vate limited company that sought to reincorporate under Hungarian law, with the Hungarian 
register refusing to label the company as the ‘universal successor’ of the Italian entity.44 The 
Court of Justice maintained that any national legislation ‘which enables national companies to 
convert, but does not allow companies governed by the law of another Member State to do so, 
falls within the scope of’ the freedom of establishment.45 A first consequence is that any re-
strictions to inbound reincorporations need to be justified by overriding reasons in the public 
interest and must be ‘appropriate for ensuring the attainment of the objectives pursued and does 
not go beyond what is necessary to attain them’.46 Consequently, a complete ban on reincor-
porations goes beyond what is necessary to protect those interests.47 Furthermore, Member 
States must comply with the principles of ‘equivalence and effectiveness’, and the recording 
of the designation ‘predecessor in law’ could not be denied to the company VALE Costruzioni 
if it was granted in domestic conversions.48 Finally, we should stress that in VALE the Court of 
Justice also addressed the concept of ‘establishment’ for the purpose of applying Articles 49 
and 54 of the Treaty. In this respect, the Court clarified that this concept ‘involves the actual 
pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establishment in the host Member State for an 
indefinite period’ and that ‘it presupposes actual establishment of the company concerned in 
that State and the pursuit of genuine economic activity there’.49 In the VALE ruling, therefore, 
the Court of Justice refers to the concept of ‘establishment’ developed in the decisions Factor-
tame50 and Cadbury Schweppes.51 From the point of view of the country of arrival, the conse-
quence is that inbound cross-border reincorporations fall within the scope of the freedom of 
establishment only if the company decides to also relocate the place where it actually pursues 
‘genuine economic activity’ into the country of arrival; by contrast, a mere relocation of the 
registered office from another Member State, without any genuine link with the country of 
arrival, is not protected by EU freedom of establishment.52  
                                                 
43 C-378/10 VALE Építési kft. [2012] (ECLI:EU:C:2012:440). 
44 VALE (n 43) [45]. 
45 VALE (n 43) [33]. 
46 VALE (n 43) [39]. The Court of Justice only refers to the decision C‑411/03 Sevic Systems [2005] ECR I‑10805, 
but this ‘test’ for assessing restrictions to the freedom of establishment was originally formulated in C-55/94, 
Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR I-04165. 
47 VALE (n 43) [40]. 
48 VALE (n 43) [57]. 
49 VALE (n 43) [34]. 
50 C-221/89, E. v Secretary of State for transport ex p. Factortame [1991] ECR I-3905 [20]. 
51 C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes plc, Cadbury Schweppes Oversead Ltd v. Commissioners of Ireland Revenue 
[2006] ECR I-8031. In the latter decision the Court also added that a company’s establishment is revealed by 
‘objective factors, which are ascertainable by third parties with regard, in particular, to the extent to which the 
company physically exists in terms of premises, staff and equipment’: Cadbury Schweppes ibid [67]. 
52 Member States, however, are free to accept that foreign companies reincorporate as domestic entities without 
relocating any economic activities. See KE Sørensen, ‘The Fight Against Letterbox Companies in the Internal 
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3.3. Legislative proposals  
The oldest proposals for harmonising private international law for companies did not include 
rules on reincorporations. Neither the proposal drafted in 1965 by the Institute of International 
Law,53 nor the European Draft Convention of 1968,54 mention the possibility to relocate a com-
pany’s ‘registered office’ abroad or to reincorporate under the law of another jurisdiction. The 
Hague Convention on the recognition of the legal personality of foreign companies, associa-
tions and institutions, drafted in 1956, only provided that contracting States should recognise 
the continuity of a company’s legal personality after a transfer of the statutory seat (siège stat-
utaire), provided that such continuity is recognised in the two States concerned.55  
In the European Community, the first detailed proposal for a directive, which was eventually 
not approved, was presented in 1997.56 The 1997 proposal did not harmonise the primary con-
necting factor, be it based on the ‘incorporation theory’ or the ‘real seat theory’.57 Consequently, 
companies that sought to reincorporate out of a real seat country needed to relocate their real 
seat abroad, and companies that sought to reincorporate into a real seat country had to relocate 
the respective connecting factor onto their territory. According to the 1997 proposal, addition-
ally, the reincorporation plan had to be published in the commercial register of the country of 
origin58 and shareholders had to approve this proposal with qualified majority.59  
In 2002 a panel of corporate law specialists, entrusted by the EU Commission with the task of 
developing reform proposals for European company law (the ‘high level group’), recom-
mended liberalising reincorporations as a way to improve both the efficient allocation of re-
sources and the quality of domestic laws.60 Along this line, the Action Plan issued in 2003 by 
the Commission, which was aimed at modernising company law, maintained that issuing a 
directive on cross-border reincorporations (which would be the 14th directive on company law) 
was a priority for the EU.61 In the following years, various resolutions and reports of the Euro-
                                                 
Market’ (2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 85, 88; Biermeyer (n 3) 67-8; T Biermeyer ‘Shaping the Right 
of Cross-Border Conversions in the EU. Between Right and Autonomy: Vale’ (2013) Common Market Law 
Review 571, 588; W Schön, ‘Das System der gesellschaftsrechtlichen Niederlassungsfreiheiten nach VALE’ 
(2013) Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 333, 351. 
53 Companies in private international law, 1965: www.justitiaetpace.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1965_var_02_en.pdf. 
54  Draft Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Bodies Corporate, 1968, OJ 2-196: 
http://aei.pitt.edu/5610/1/5610.pdf 
55 Hague Convention concerning the recognition of the legal personality of foreign companies, associations and 
institutions, available 1956, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=36. 
56 Document XV/D2/6002/97-EN REV.2 (hereinafter the ‘1997 Proposal’). See also Drury (n 3). 
57 Art. 3, 1997 Proposal of a 14th Directive. 
58 Art. 4, 1997 Proposal of a 14th Directive. 
59 Art. 6, 1997 Proposal of a 14th Directive 
60 High Level Group, ‘A modern regulatory framework for company law in Europe’, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/report_en.pdf, p. 101. 
61 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – Modernising Company 
Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – A Plan to Move Forward, (COM(2003) 284 
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pean Parliament have requested the European Commission to present new proposal for a di-
rective on the cross border transfer of companies’ registered offices,62 specifying that Member 
States should adopt provisions for the protection of dissenting shareholders, including a with-
drawal right from the ‘emigrating’ company, and creditors should be protected by a security 
deposit.  
A full-fledged policy analysis conducted in 2007, however, has revealed a more complex situ-
ation. This assessment concluded that harmonisation could be too onerous and not proportion-
ate, ‘considering that the practical effect of the existing legislation on cross-border mobility 
(i.e. the Cross-Border Merger Directive) is not yet known and that the Community approach to 
the issue of the transfer of the registered office might be clarified by the Court of Justice in the 
near future’, with the consequence that ‘it might be advisable to wait until the impacts of those 
developments can be fully assessed and the need and scope for any EU action better defined.’63 
Therefore, the project of harmonising Member States’ regimes on cross-border transfers of the 
registered office was eventually put on hold.  
Finally, a public consultation launched in 2012 on the future of European company law con-
firmed the interest of the respondents in a legislative initiative aimed at clarifying that European 
companies can transfer their registered office throughout the EU and reincorporate in another 
Member State without having to liquidate in the country of origin, and at regulating such cross-
border reincorporations.64 The 2012 Action Plan on company law and corporate governance65 
acknowledged that the issue of cross-border reincorporations was relevant and that ‘any future 
initiative in this matter needs to be underpinned by robust economic data and a thorough as-
sessment of a practical and genuine need for and use made of European rules on transfer of 
seat.’ Following this acknowledgement, in 2013, the European Commission launched a new 
public consultation on the transfer of a company’s seat, which confirmed that in most Member 
States the rules on cross-border transfers of statutory seat (or registered office) were still un-
clear and that the Court’s decisions rendered in the cases Cartesio and VALE were not sufficient 
to clarify all regulatory issues.66 Finally, we should mention that the Commission’ Work Pro-
gramme 2017 does not mention initiatives for cross-border transfer of registered offices or 
                                                 
final) at 22. See also the consultation launched in 2004: 
http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/results/transfer/index_en.htm. 
62  See Resolution of the European Parliament of 25 October 2007 [P6_TA(2007)0491]; Resolution of the 
European Parliament of 10 March 2009 [P6_TA(2009)0086]; Resolution of the European Parliament of 2 
February 2012 [P7_TA(2012)0019]. 
63 See Commission of the European Community, Impact assessment on the Directive on the cross-border transfer 
of registered office, Brussels, 12.12.2007 SEC(2007) 1707. See GJ Vossestein, ‘Transfer of the Registered Office: 
The European Commission’s Decision Not to Submit a Proposal for a Directive’ (2008) 4 Utrecht Law Review 
53. 
64 See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2012/companylaw/feedback_statement_en.pdf. 
65  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Action Plan: European company law and corporate governance 
– a modern legal framework for more engaged shareholders and sustainable companies (Text with EEA relevance) 
Strasbourg, 12.12.2012 COM(2012) 740 final. 
66 See European Commission (DG Market), Feedback statement, Summary of responses to the public consultation 
on Cross-border transfers if registered offices of companies, September 2013.  
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reincorporations67 and the plan put forward by the Estonian Presidency is still uncertain as to 
whether initiative in this field are necessary or not;68 at the same time, a new consultation was 
just launched, which includes conflict-of-law rules for companies and cross-border ‘conver-
sions’.69 It can be suggested of course that including the latter topic in this consultation may be 
seen as somehow inconsistent with the Work Programme as a cross-border conversion may 
just be another terms for a reincorporation.  
 
4. VOLUNTARY OUTBOUND REINCORPORATIONS IN THE EU 
4.1. Policy and legal issues  
Whether a company can reincorporate in another (EU) jurisdiction will depend, first, on the 
company law of the current State of incorporation. In particular, the question will turn on 
whether the State of origin permits, as a matter of practice, a process whereby a domestic com-
pany is struck from its register and thus loses its status under that law without going through a 
formal liquidation procedure. Even where this is the case, the practical possibility for compa-
nies to reincorporate abroad will also depend on the interoperability of the applicable substan-
tive and procedural rules for such a reincorporation in both the country of origin and the desti-
nation country. Whether reincorporations are in fact possible can thus only be precisely an-
swered for specific pairs of countries.  
From a policy perspective, a Member State’s desire to allow or prohibit outbound reincorpora-
tions will depend on a number of different factors. Perhaps most importantly, it will depend on 
the way in which a given jurisdiction views – and uses – company law rules: Member States 
that view company law primarily as way to facilitate structures that minimise agency problems 
arising between shareholders and directors will naturally see the continued applicability of their 
company law rules as less important than jurisdictions with a broader, especially social view 
of the tasks and aims of company law. In several Member States, company law rules, besides 
regulating companies’ internal affairs, that is to say the agency problem arising between share-
holders and directors and the relation among shareholders, also address agency problems aris-
ing between companies and their creditors. For instance, a widespread strategy for protecting 
creditors is based on rules on capital formation and capital maintenance, and minimum capital 
requirements in public (and possibly private) companies; yet, the intensity of creditor protec-
tion varies from Member State to Member State.70 Additionally, in several jurisdictions the 
level of creditor protection is higher in public companies than in private companies.71 Further-
more, certain Member States include in the lex societatis rules on debentures and the powers 
                                                 
67 See Commission Work Programme 2017 at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/cwp_2017_en.pdf. 
68 See the programme for a ‘21st European Company Law and Corporate Governance Conference: Crossing 
Borders, Digitally’ at http://www.just.ee/en/conferences-during-estonian-presidency. 
69 See https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/runner/CompanyLawPackageSurvey2017.  
70 See e.g. E Ferran, ‘The Place for Creditor Protection on the Agenda for Modernisation of Company Law in the 
European Union’ (2006) 3 European Company and Financial Law Review 178, 214-17. 
71 See Enriques and Gelter (n 15). 
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of debenture holders, while in most jurisdictions these issues are governed by the lex contrac-
tus.72 Finally, it is worth noting that in some Member States employees have the right to appoint 
a certain number of directors or members of the supervisory board (‘codetermination’).73 
In these circumstances, a reincorporation under the law of another jurisdiction could be seen 
as harming creditors or employees if the new jurisdiction is less protective than the country of 
origin,74 unless that country regards these rules as overriding mandatory provisions also appli-
cable to (pseudo-)foreign companies (to the extent that such outreach-application is compatible 
with the Treaty). The impact of reincorporations on creditors and other stakeholders also de-
pends on the scope of company law in the country of origin. If rules protecting creditors and 
other stakeholders are included in the scope of company law, reincorporations might harm 
these stakeholders, if the country of arrival is not as ‘protective’ as the country of origin. By 
contrast, if the country of origin protects creditors and other stakeholders through ‘non-com-
pany law’ rules, such as insolvency law or tort law, a reincorporation is likely to be less harmful 
to pre-existing stakeholders, who can continue to rely on the application of insolvency or tort 
law of the country of origin (unless all relevant connecting factors, including a company’s 
COMI, are moved together with the registered office).75  
Regarding creditor protection, things are further complicated by the significant differences be-
tween the regulation of private and public companies that exist in several countries. Rules on 
creditor protection of public companies are partially harmonised at EU level, while virtually 
no such harmonisation has taken place in relation to private companies.76 Furthermore, in re-
cent years a trend has emerged throughout the European Union to reduce or abolish minimum 
capital requirements, at least as far as private limited companies are concerned.77 Consequently, 
in some Member States significant differences have emerged in the level of protection afforded 
to creditors of private and public companies, respectively. The effects of a reincorporation may 
thus depend not only on each country’s regime, but also on national company types involved. 
Moreover, powers of minority shareholders and strategies aimed at protecting them vary from 
Member State to Member State.78 Where the law of the country of arrival is less protective of 
minority shareholders than the country of origin, a cross-border reincorporation could therefore 
also harm this group of stakeholders.  
                                                 
72 According to the country reports accompanying the Study on the Law Applicable to Companies (see n 4 above), 
in most Member States, the validity, content and underlying rights of bonds fall within the scope of the Rome I 
Regulation; in Bulgaria, Italy and Portugal, however, bonds issued by domestic companies are, at least in part, 
governed by domestic rules.  
73 A comprehensive overview of jurisdictions adopting worker participation at the board level is to be found at 
www.worker-participation.eu/About-WP/European-Participation-Index-EPI. 
74  For example, this is the case when the law of country of arrival does not provide for codetermination 
mechanisms or when capital maintenance rules are weaker than those of the country of origin. 
75 Lombardo (n 37) 647; FM Mucciarelli, ‘The Function of Corporate Law and the Effects of Reincorporations in 
the U.S. and the EU’ (2012) 20 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 421, 458-61. 
76 Directive 77/91/EEC of the Council (Second Company Law Directive). 
77 See GH Roth and P Kindler, The Spirit of Corporate Law – Core Principles of Corporate Law in Continental 
Europe (C.H. Beck 2013) 60.  
78 See PH Conac, L Enriques and M Gelter, ‘Constraining Dominant Shareholders’ Self Dealing’ (2007) 4 
European Company and Financial Law Review 490. 
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These are the main policy reasons why in several Member States reincorporations are restricted 
or not allowed by national law. In particular, a complete ban of outbound reincorporations, 
although it is unlikely to be compatible with the Treaty, would be an effective strategy to pro-
tect the acquired interests and expectations of pre-existing creditors or other stakeholders, who 
rely on the application of company law rules of the country of incorporation. Alternatively, 
when reincorporations are allowed, the State of incorporation may provide for specific legal 
mechanisms and procedural safeguards to protect minority shareholders, creditors and other 
stakeholders, such as: (a) supermajority requirements for the approval of these decisions; (b) 
further safeguards aimed at protecting dissenting minority shareholders, such as the right to 
withdraw from the company; (c) special safeguards aimed at protecting creditors, such as the 
right to object to the reincorporation or to request a guarantee.79  
Finally, it is important to also assess the procedural and technical aspects of reincorporations 
in the State of origin. Such technicalities and procedures have significant practical and theoret-
ical implications. Companies typically do not exist unless registered in an official commercial 
or company register. Companies, in other words, cannot exist independently from a jurisdiction 
of incorporation and, consequently, reincorporations require continuity of registrations across 
jurisdictions. Once a company – in accordance with the private international law rules of both 
jurisdictions involved – starts being governed by the law of the new jurisdiction, its articles of 
association need to comply with the provisions of that jurisdiction.80 Furthermore, it is the State 
of origin that governs the point in time when the domestic commercial register strikes off that 
company. In this context, the question arises of whether the ‘emigrating company’ should be 
cancelled only after it has been registered in the companies register of the destination country 
as a domestically incorporated company. If a company was cancelled from the company reg-
ister of the State of origin before being registered in the State of arrival, there would be a period 
during which that company would not be registered anywhere, and thus not exist. All these 
issues, as we shall see in the subsequent comparative analysis, are still uncertain in most EU 
Member States. 
 
4.2. Comparative analysis  
Despite the most recent decisions of the Court of Justice, Member States still follow a variety 
of strategies with regard to cross-border reincorporations of domestic companies, ranging from 
complete prohibition to explicit and detailed regulations of these transactions. In this respect, 
we have classified Member States into three groups, considering the ‘law in action’, not just 
the ‘law on the books’. This classification is based on whether, and to what extent, reincorpo-
rations are accepted and feasible in a given legal system. In jurisdictions where reincorpora-
tions are not regulated, this analysis also sheds light on how legal scholars and courts react to 
the developments of EU law and adapt the interpretation of domestic law accordingly. The first 
category of countries includes jurisdictions that explicitly allow domestic companies to change 
                                                 
79 For details see the subsequent section 4.2. 
80 See T Luchsinger, Die Niederlassungsfreiheit der Kapitalgesellschaften in der EG, den USA und der Schweiz 
(Universitätverlag Freiburg 1992) 21. 
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the applicable company law without liquidation and that regulate, either partially or compre-
hensively, this operation. The second group of countries comprehends jurisdictions from which 
outbound reincorporations are, as a matter of fact, impossible or not allowed despite the most 
recent decisions of the Court of Justice. The last group includes jurisdictions that do not regu-
late reincorporations, but where scholars and courts are increasingly of the opinion that domes-
tic companies should have the possibility to reincorporate abroad despite the lack of rules. 
(a) Jurisdictions that explicitly allow voluntary outbound reincorporations  
One group of jurisdictions, namely Belgium, France, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal, stat-
utorily allow domestic companies to ‘reincorporate’ abroad, or to change their ‘nationality’, 
although domestic legislation does not fully regulate the procedural details of this transaction. 
Interestingly, all of these countries retain certain elements of the ‘real seat theory’, and the 
applicability of these elements to EU-incorporated companies is often not entirely clear. The 
consequence of relying on the real seat as relevant connecting factor for reincorporations within 
the EU would be that companies should transfer both their administrative seat and their statu-
tory seat in order to reincorporate abroad. All of the above regimes except Belgium regulate 
the internal decision procedure and the mechanisms for protecting shareholders, while no spe-
cial creditor protection rules are foreseen. According to the Portuguese Companies Act, the 
general meeting of shareholders has to approve the transfer of the real seat abroad with a su-
permajority of 75% of the share capital and dissenting or absent shareholders can withdraw 
from the company; however, there is no provision to protect creditors.81 French82 companies, 
by contrast, can change their ‘nationality’ (that is to say, they can reincorporate in another 
jurisdiction without liquidation) only by unanimous decision, which makes these transactions 
almost impossible in the case of widely held companies. This was also the case for Luxem-
bourgish companies until a recent amendment of the general company law.83 Greek public lim-
ited companies can reincorporate abroad by deciding with qualified majority;84 additionally, 
dissenting shareholders are protected through the right of withdrawal from the company.85 In 
Greek private companies, on the other hand, a unanimous decision is required.86 Despite statu-
tory rules in these jurisdictions explicitly allowing domestic companies to change the lex so-
cietatis without liquidation, the procedure to implement outbound reincorporations is not or 
only partially regulated. Therefore, the risk arises that companies are cancelled from the regis-
ter of the jurisdiction of origin before they are registered in the commercial register of the new 
                                                 
81 Código das Sociedades Comerciais (Commercial Companies Act) Decree-Law No. 76-A/2006, as amended, 
art. 3(5). 
82 For French private companies see Code de Commerce, art. L 223-30, while for French public companies see 
Code de Commerce, art. L 225-97 (unless a bilateral treaty exists with the country of destination). 
83 See Luxembourg Commercial Companies Act 1915: art. 119 for private companies and art. 67-1 for public 
companies, as amended by the act n. 167/2016 of 10 August 2016, art. 45 and art. 98 (in public companies the 
required majority is 2/3 of the votes cast, while in private companies the majority is 3/4 of the votes cast). 
84 Act 2190/1920, arts. 29-31. 
85 Act 2190/1920, art. 49(a). 
86 Act 3190/1955, art. 38(3)(a). 
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jurisdiction. Finally, as we have mentioned above, the Belgian regime allows domestic com-
panies to re-incorporate abroad,87 but the procedure for the implementation of this decision is 
not regulated at all. 
Other jurisdictions clearly regulate reincorporations through detailed rules on the internal de-
cision-making process and the registration procedures. These countries are: Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Malta and Spain. These jurisdictions show how legislation on cross-border 
reincorporations can be drafted in order to take into account the interests of all stakeholders 
and to address all procedural issues. In all of these countries, reincorporations require a super-
majority decision of the shareholders to transfer the registered office or statutory seat abroad. 
One reason for an explicit legal instrument regulating reincorporations is the need to protect 
minority shareholders from risks related to a change of the lex societatis. As we have already 
seen, the most common strategies to protect minorities are supermajority or high quorum re-
quirements and withdrawal rights of dissenting shareholders. In all Member States with com-
prehensive legislation on reincorporations,88 the decision to reincorporate has to be taken by 
the general meeting of shareholders by supermajority.89  
Some of the Member States with a comprehensive regulation of cross-border reincorporations 
grant a right to withdraw from the company to dissenting shareholders.90 In this respect, it is 
worth noting that a withdrawal right is also granted to dissenting shareholders by the legislation 
of some of the Member States that allow reincorporations without comprehensively regulating 
this operation (Greece, for public companies, and Portugal) and by the Italian regime, which 
we will analyse in the third group of countries. By contrast, other jurisdictions that allow rein-
corporations (Greece, for private companies, France and Luxembourg) require that this deci-
sion is to be taken unanimously, which can be considered as a functional equivalent of share-
holders’ withdrawal right.  
Most of the regimes that comprehensively regulate reincorporations explicitly govern the pro-
cedure for cancelling a domestic company from the local register, thus avoiding that the com-
pany is cancelled before it is registered in the new jurisdiction. Finally, Member States having 
                                                 
87 Belgian Private international law act (Loi portant le Code de droit international privé, 16 July 2004), art. 112. 
88 Curiously, Czech companies can decide to transfer their statutory seat abroad without triggering a change of 
company law. These companies are cancelled from the Czech company register, despite keeping the Czech lex 
societatis, with the consequence that such a transfer is only feasible if the country of arrival accepts that a 
domestically registered company is governed by a foreign law: Act 125/2008 (Transformation Act). 
89 Cyprus: 3/4 of attending shareholders (Companies Act art. 354L, as amended by the act 24(I)/2006, and art. 
135); Czech Republic: this decision should be approved by 3/4 of attending shareholders (Sections 17 and 21 
Transformations Act). Denmark: 2/3 of attending shareholders (Companies Act, s. 106). Malta: unless more 
stringent requirements are provided in the articles of association (a) for public companies 75% in nominal value 
of the shares represented and entitled to vote at the meeting and at least 51% per cent in nominal value of all the 
shares entitled to vote at the meeting; (b) for private companies 51% in the nominal value of the shares conferring 
that right (Subsidiary Legislation 386.05, Continuation of Companies Regulation of 26 November, 2002, art. 13 
and Companies Act 1996, art. 135). Spain: (a) for private companies the majority required is 2/3 of their capital; 
(b) for public companies the majority depends on the number of shareholders attending the meeting (1/2 of voting 
shares if 50% or more of voting capital attended the meeting, or 2/3 of voting shares if between 25% and 50% of 
shares with voting capital attended the meeting (Ley 3/2009, sobre modificaciones estructurales de las sociedades 
mercantiles, No 3/2009, hereinafter ‘Structural Modification of Companies Act’, art. 97). 
90 Denmark: Companies Act 2009, as amended, s. 16a; Spain: Structural Modification of Companies Act, art. 99. 
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detailed regulations on cross-border conversions in place also provide for adequate creditor 
protection mechanisms, mostly based on a right of creditors whose claims occurred before the 
initial plan to reincorporate was made public to object to the reincorporation91 or request a 
security.92 The Danish regime is based on the creditors’ right to file their claim or require a 
security, unless an independent expert officially declares that creditors are sufficiently pro-
tected.93 Interestingly, the Cypriot and Maltese regimes require that the directors of emigrating 
companies issue a solvency statement in which they declare that ‘they are not aware of any 
circumstances that could negatively influence the solvency of the company within a period of 
three years.’94 
(b) Jurisdictions in which voluntary outbound reincorporations are either not allowed or 
are practically impossible  
If we look at national regimes as they operate in practice, we can see that, despite the most 
recent decisions of the Court of Justice in Cartesio and VALE, several jurisdictions still prohibit 
or make impossible outbound reincorporations. These countries are: Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the United Kingdom. As a matter of fact, companies incorpo-
rated in these countries cannot relocate their statutory seat or registered office abroad and can-
not reincorporate under the law of a different Member State without prior liquidation.  
It is worth considering the position of the UK,95 which is to be contrasted with other common 
law jurisdictions, such as Cyprus and Malta. The leading case is Gasque v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners, where Macnaughten J stated clearly that companies cannot have a domicile of 
choice, by stressing that ‘[t]he domicile of origin, or the domicile of birth, using with respect 
to a company a familiar metaphor, clings to it throughout its existence’.96 Therefore, even when 
a UK company decides to reincorporate in another jurisdiction, it cannot simply be struck off 
the register for this reason and, if the country of arrival accepts its registration according to 
domestic law, under the viewpoint of UK law a new company exists, which is entirely separate 
from the original UK entity.97 Additionally, even if courts were to accept the position that, in 
                                                 
91 Cyprus: Companies Act art. 354M; Malta: Continuation of Companies Regulation art. 15(2); Spain: Structural 
Modification of Companies Act, art. 100. 
92 Czech Republic: Transformation Act, ss. 35 and 59u. 
93 Danish Companies Act, Chapter 16a. 
94 For Cyprus see The Companies Law Cap. 113, s 354K. The language used by the Maltese Companies Act (art. 
13(b)(i)) is almost identical: ‘a declaration […] confirming the solvency of the company and confirming that the 
directors are not aware of any circumstances which could negatively affect in a material manner the solvency 
position of the company within a period of twelve months’. 
95 This article has been drafted without considering the effects of the referendum on the withdrawal of the United 
Kingdom from the European Union of 23 June 2016. At present, the outcome of negotiations between the UK 
government and the governments of the other 27 Member States is still unpredictable. At this stage, it cannot be 
excluded that the UK will completely retreat from the single market, in which case the freedom of establishment 
would no longer be applicable to their companies and to EU-based companies that aim at moving into the UK.  
96 Gasque v Inland revenue commissioners [1940] 2 KB 80, 84. See also National Trust Company v. Ebro 
Irrigation & Power Ltd. [1954] DLR 326; International Credit and Investment Co v. Adham [1994] 1 BCLC 66. 
97 Re Irrigation Company of France Ltd (1871) LR 6 Ch App 176; A Farnsworth, The Residence and Domicile of 
Corporations (Butterworth 1939) 222; PS Smart, ‘Corporate Domicile and Multiple Incorporation in English 
Private International Law’ (1990) Journal of Business Law 126; Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Law 
(Sweet and Maxwell 2012) para. 30-003. This policy choice was renewed recently, when the company law reform 
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the aftermath of Cartesio, UK law cannot unilaterally prohibit domestic companies from con-
verting into entities governed by the law of another Member State,98 it would remain uncertain 
how reincorporations would be implemented in practice.  
In Ireland, whose approach regarding the lex societatis is identical to the approach adopted in 
the UK,99 the impact of the Cartesio ruling has been debated in light of possible amendments 
to Irish company law. In particular, the government entrusted a group of experts, the Company 
Law Review Group, with assessing the impact of ECJ case law on Irish regime prohibiting 
reincorporations.100 The Company Law Review Group maintained that the Cartesio decision 
is binding regarding voluntary outbound reincorporations, so that barriers against this decision 
posed by the country of origin violate the freedom of establishment under the Treaty unless 
they serve overriding requirements in the public interest. Therefore, the Company Law Review 
Group recommended to introduce provisions that allow cross-border conversion in the new 
companies act. However, such changes were not implemented when the new statute was even-
tually adopted in 2014.  
The Polish regime is also interesting. On the one hand, Article 19(1) of the Polish Private In-
ternational Law Act maintains that transfers of seat within the EEA do not result in the loss of 
legal personality; on the other hand, a shareholders’ resolution on relocation of the statutory 
seat is treated akin to a liquidation decision according to Articles 270(2) and 459(2) of te Com-
mercial Company Act. As a consequence, Polish companies that seek to reincorporate abroad 
must pay all their debts and liquidate all assets and the entire business, but this does not lead 
to a loss of their legal personality, which continues after their re-registration in the country of 
arrival. It goes without saying that this is akin to making reincorporations impossible in prac-
tice.101  
With regard to the Hungarian regime, it is interesting to note that Hungarian companies still 
cannot, as a practical matter, reincorporate abroad, with little discussion of the direct applica-
bility of the Court of Justice’s interpretation of the Treaty in Cartesio. Regarding Romania, in 
2014 a decision of the Court of Appeal of Brasov rejected a request for reincorporation to the 
UK on the basis of two arguments: first, that case law of the Court of Justice (Cartesio in 
particular) did not provide any clear guideline regarding the procedure for reincorporations and 
no specific rules had been adopted in Romania; second, that the specific company that sought 
                                                 
of 2006 did not implement the proposal made by the Company law steering group to allow identity preserving 
company law changes. See Company law steering group, completing the structure, 2000, URN 00/1335, 11, 54 
and Final Report, 2001, chapter 14 
98 See E Ferran, ‘Corporate Mobility and Company Law’ (2016) 79 Modern Law Review 813, 830. 
99 See Kutchera v Buckingham International Holdings Ltd [1988] 1 IR 61, 68. 
100 CLRG Sixth Report 2010-2011, par. 6.2.1, available at www.clrg.org/publications/clrg-sixth-report-2010-
2011.pdf. 
101 As we shall see in the final section of this article, the compatibility of the Polish regime with the Treaty will 
be addressed by the Court of Justice when it will decide on the case C-106/16, Polbud v Wykonawstwo sp. z.o.o., 
which concerns a Polish company seeking to reincorporate in another Member State. 
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to reincorporate in the UK did not provide evidence that all formalities had actually been ful-
filled in the country of arrival.102 
(c) Jurisdictions that do not explicitly regulate voluntary outbound reincorporations 
In several Member States, neither statutory law, nor judge-made law address outbound rein-
corporations. In most of these jurisdictions (Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Slovenia and 
Sweden) it is still not clear whether domestically incorporated companies can actually reincor-
porate abroad by way of a transfer of statutory seat, but in some of them an increasing aware-
ness of the impact of EU law on freedom of reincorporation is emerging.103 Among legal sys-
tems without an explicit regulation, we should analyse two groups of countries in which this 
issue has been largely debated, although with partially diverging solutions: on the one hand, 
Austria, Germany and the Netherland, and, on the other hand, Italy.  
In the former group of jurisdictions, outbound reincorporations by way of transfer of a com-
pany’s statutory seat abroad were traditionally prohibited. In Germany, for instance, which 
until Centros represented the most significant case of a consistent application of the ‘real seat’ 
theory, a decision to transfer the statutory seat of domestic companies abroad would be seen as 
void,104 while older case law even interpreted it as a decision to liquidate the company.105 Nev-
ertheless, Austrian, German and Dutch commentators accept, in light of the decisions Cartesio 
and VALE, that voluntary outbound reincorporations into other EU Member States must be 
allowed as a matter of EU law, although a considerable degree of uncertainty exists regarding 
their procedural requirements, as well as creditor and employee protection.106 In Austria and 
                                                 
102 Court of Appeal Brasov, No. 910/2014, 6528/62/2013, at http://legeaz.net/spete-drept-comercial-curtea-de-
apel-brasov-2014/plangere-impotriva-rezolutiei-directorului-orc-23-09-2014-g90. 
103 Also note the position of Estonia, where reincorporations are not regulated at all and it still unclear whether 
this transaction is feasible. As a matter of fact, however, Estonian companies are cancelled from the local register 
when they relocate their registered office abroad. In Slovenia, additionally, despite the absence of statutory rules 
in this respect, some academic scholars submit that such transactions should be made possible as a consequence 
of the Cartesio and VALE rulings. See Prostor, ‘Razdružitev statutarnega in dejanskega sedeža slovenske družbe’ 
(2014) Pravnik 1-2. 
104 See L Fastrich, in Baumbach & Hueck’s GmbHG (C.H. Beck 20th  edn, 2013) s 4a para. 9; ibid. See e.g. 
BayObLG 11 February 2004, in AG 2004, 266; OLG München 4 October 2007, in ZIP 2007, 2124. 
105 See B Grossfeld, Internationales Gesellschaftrecht, in Staudinger’s Kommentar BGB (DeGruyter 1998) para. 
605; M-P Weller, ‘Zur identitätswahrender Wegzug deutscher Gesellschaften’ (2004) Deutsches Steuerrecht 
1218; Fastrich (n 104). A complete analysis of case law can be found in A Frank, Formwechsel im Binnenmarkt 
(Mohr Siebeck 2016) 40 (with further references). See e.g. BGH, 21 March 1986, BGHZ 97, 334 and BayObLG 
7 May 1992, BayOBLGZ, 1992, 113. 
106 For Austria see e.g. N Adensamer and G Eckert, ‘Umzug von Gesellschaften in Europa, insbesondere Wegzug 
österreichischer Gesellschaften ins Ausland’ (2004) Gesellschaftsrecht 52; G Eckert, Internationales 
Gesellschaftsrecht (Manz 2010) 564. For Germany, see e.g. W Bayer and J Schmidt, ‘Grenzüberschreitende 
Sitzverlegung und grenzberschreitende Restrukturierungen nach MoMiG, Cartesio und Trabrennbahn’ (2009) 173 
Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 735; J Hushahn, ‘Grenzüberschreitende Formwechsel 
im EU/EWR-Raum – die identitätswahrende statutenwechselnde Verlegung des Satzungssitzes in der notariellen 
Praxis’ (2014) Rheinische Notar-Zeitschrift 137, 142-9; G Janisch, Die grenzüberschreitende Sitzverlegung von 
Kapitalgesellschaften in der Europäischen Union (Nomos, 2015) 293; Frank (n 105) 174-257 (suggesting 
application of most rules on national conversions by way of analogy, provided that companies also relocate a 
genuine link to the host state). For the Netherlands see M Zilinsky, ‘Cartesio: zetelverplaatsing en de vrijheid van 
vestiging’ (2009) WPNR 6787, 153-4; A Stroeve, ‘Het VALE-arrest en de ‘inbound’ grensoverschrijdende 
omzetting in Nederland’ (2013) Tijdschrift voor de Ondernemingsrechtspraktijk 72. 
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in the Netherlands, the idea that domestically incorporated companies can voluntarily reincor-
porate abroad without liquidation in spite of the lack of statutory regulation does not seem to 
have been tested in court. A German court, by contrast, has recently maintained that cross-
border outbound reincorporations from Germany have to be allowed despite the lack of any 
regulations, in the wake of the VALE decision of the Court of Justice.107 Regarding Germany, 
it is also worth remembering that, before the Cartesio and VALE decisions, legal practitioners 
had developed another procedure for the transfer of the seat of a German company abroad: the 
German company converts into a partnership – a GmbH & Co KG with a newly formed foreign 
corporation as one of the partners – followed by a withdrawal of all German partners from the 
partnership with the result that all assets of the partnership accrue to the foreign shareholder.108 
However, it does not seem to be the case that this happens frequently in practice, presumably, 
due to the complex tax implications of such a conversion of a company to a partnership.109 In 
the Netherlands, on the other hand, although companies seem to prefer entering into cross-
border mergers, reincorporations abroad are not infrequent and practitioners have developed a 
standardised procedure based upon the application, by way of analogy, of the rules on cross-
border mergers and domestic conversions.110 Furthermore, a draft bill is being discussed by the 
Dutch Parliament and is likely to be approved soon.111  
Finally, Italian law represents a fairly distinct position. Italian companies are explicitly allowed 
to transfer their ‘statutory seat’ (sede legale) abroad by way of a supermajority decision of the 
general meeting amending the articles of association,112 and dissenting or absent shareholders 
have the right to withdraw from their company.113 Furthermore, the Italian Private International 
Law Act stipulates that any transfer of the statutory seat is effective only if both conflict and 
                                                 
107 OLG Frankfurt a.M., 03.01.2017 - 20 W 88/15 (conversion of a German GmbH into an Italian srl). See C 
Teichmann ‘Grenzüberschreitender Formwechsel kraft vorauseilender Eintragung in Aufmahmestaat? (2017) 
ZIP, forthcoming (criticising both the registration of the company in the Italian register, without all pre-requisites, 
and the acceptance of such registration by the German court). Another case of reincorporation (from Germany to 
Austria) is reported by K Jennewein, ‘Grenzüberschreitende Sitzverlegung einer deutschen GmbH nach 
Österreich’ (2016) Der Gesellschafter 277. 
108 R Ege and S Klett, ‘Praxisfragen der grenzüberschreitenden Mobilität von Gesellschaften’ (2012) Deutsches 
Steuerrecht 2442, 2446; C Teichmann, ‘Die Auslandsgesellschaft & Co.’ (2014) 32 Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- 
und Gesellschaftsrecht 220, 223; Frank (n 105) 58. See Hans Brochier Holding Ltd v. Exner [2006] EWHC 2594. 
109 Based on Umwandlungssteuergesetz (UmwStG), s 14. 
110 The procedure is regularly applied and the intention for conversion is disclosed in the Staatscourant. See 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/zoeken/staatscourant. 
111  Draft bill of 12 January 2012, available at 
www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2012/01/12/wetsvoorstel-grensoverschrijdende-omzetting-
van-kapitaalvennootschappen. 
112 Public companies (società per azioni): at first call, quorum and majority are 1/2 of the legal capital; at second 
call, the quorum is 1/3 of the legal capital, while the majority is 2/3 of represented capital; at third call, the quorum 
is 1/5 of the legal capital and the majority is 2/3 of represented capital; however, in ‘closed’ public companies 
(i.e., neither listed nor widely held), the majority of votes in favour to the reincorporation should also correspond 
to at least 1/3 of the whole capital (Codice civile, art. 2369). Private companies (società a responsabilità limitata): 
quorum and majorities 1/2 of the legal capital (Codice civile, art. 2379-bis(3)). 
113 Codice civile, art. 2347, for public companies, and art. 2473 for private companies. See M Ventoruzzo, ‘Cross-
border Mergers, Change of Applicable Corporate Laws and Protection of Dissenting Shareholders: Withdrawal 
Rights under Italian Law’ (2007) 6 European Company and Financial Law Review 47.  
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substantive rules of all States involved are respected.114 Therefore, the Italian regime seems to 
be more in line with countries that allow reincorporations without clarifying, or without fully 
clarifying, the details of this procedure, such as France or Belgium (which we have classified 
under the second group of countries). According to the Italian private international law regime, 
however, companies are governed by the law of the State in which the formation procedure 
was fulfilled.115 Consequently, several judicial decisions and local offices of the commercial 
register maintain that Italian companies cannot change their lex societatis and that a transfer 
abroad of a company’s statutory seat is only effective if it does not trigger a change of appli-
cable company regime.116 The practical application of these rules, however, is not univocal and 
other local offices of the commercial register simply strike off domestically incorporated com-
panies after a decision to relocate their statutory seat, without inquiring whether the company 
has actually been re-registered in the commercial register of the country of arrival.117 It is worth 
mentioning, however, that an increasing number of scholars,118 judicial decisions119 and local 
offices of the company’s registrar120 maintain that, in the wake of Cartesio and VALE, Italian 
companies should be allowed to change the applicable law without liquidation, by transferring 
their statutory seat abroad, provided that the country of arrival accepts this change and that its 
rules are respected. The situation is, therefore, still uncertain, but scholars and practitioners 
seem to be increasingly aware of the impact on domestic law of most recent decisions of the 
Court of Justice.  
 
5. VOLUNTARY INBOUND REINCORPORATIONS IN THE EU 
5.1. Policy and legal issues 
Cross-border reincorporations should also be analysed from the viewpoint of the country whose 
law the company seeks to adopt. The legal and policy issues that arise from that Member State’s 
                                                 
114 Act No. 218/1995, Italian Private International Law Act, art. 25(3) 
115 Act No. 218/1995, Italian Private International Law Act, art. 25(1).  
116 See Corte d’Appello Trieste 9.10.1999, (2000) 54 Rivista del notariato 167; Corte di Cassazione 23.1.2004, n. 
1244 (on which see F Mucciarelli, ‘The Transfer of Registered Office and Forum Shopping in International 
Insolvency Cases: an Important Decision from Italy’ (2005) 4 European Company and Financial Law Review 
512). Among legal scholars see D Damascelli, I conflitti di legge in materia societaria (Cacucci 2004) 131. This 
is probably one of the reasons why Fiat Chrisler Automotive reincorporated as a Dutch entity by way of a cross-
border merger. See F Pernazza, ‘La mobilità delle società in Europa, da Daily Mail a Fiat Chrysler Automotive’ 
(2015) 29 Diritto del commercio internazionale 439. 
117 This risk is not trivial, as the cases Interedil and VALE, both related to the ‘emigration’ of Italian companies, 
clearly show. The Interedil case will be addressed thoroughly in section 6.1, below. 
118 T Ballarino, Diritto internazionale privato (Cedam 3rd edn, 1999) 360; MV Benedettelli ‘Sul trasferimento 
della sede sociale all’estero’ (2010) 55 Rivista delle società 1264; FM Mucciarelli, Società di capitali, 
trasferimento all’estero della sede sociale e arbitraggi normativi (Giuffrè 2010) 174-8. 
119  Tribunale Monza 5.4.2002, (2003) 30 Giurisprudenza commerciale, II/558; Tribunale Torino 10.1.2007, 
(2007) 159 Giurisprudenza Italiana, 1679. 
120  The most significant example is the Milan branch of the Commercial Register: 
www.mi.camcom.it/web/guest/trasferimenti-di-sede-all-estero-e-dall-estero. Interestingly, this commercial 
register accepts that local companies relocate their statutory seat to another EU Member State and decide to keep 
the Italian lex societatis. These companies, therefore, continue to be registered in the Milan office of the register, 
which ‘fictively’ considers the original ‘statutory seat’ as the actual seat for registration purposes.  
23 
 
perspective often mirror those addressed by the State of original incorporation. Thus, most 
Member States that allow outbound reincorporations also allow the inbound conversion of for-
eign companies into domestic ones. A few exceptions do however exist. 
The preliminary question is whether private international law and substantive rules of the coun-
try of arrival allow foreign companies to convert into domestic companies without liquidating 
in the State of origin and by ensuring continuity of their legal personality. One approach is, of 
course, simply to prohibit inbound reincorporations. In this case, when a foreign company de-
cides to transfer its statutory seat or registered office and re-register in the domestic company 
register as a local company, this decision would – at most – be regarded as the decision to 
register a new company, which is neither the ‘same legal person’ as the original company, nor 
its legal successor.121 Therefore, from the standpoint of the incoming country, no debts and 
credits, and no contracts – including employment contracts – of the former company are trans-
ferred to the newly registered company. Furthermore, shareholders would need to make con-
tributions to the company’s capital according to domestic substantive company law. Alterna-
tively, the commercial registers of Member States that do not accept inbound reincorporations 
may simply register a domestic branch or an establishment of a foreign company, even though 
that company sought to re-register under the new law. In both cases, if the emigrating company 
was cancelled from the register of the original State of incorporation, while the State of arrival 
did not accept inbound reincorporations, the company would ‘disappear’ from any company 
register without being officially liquidated, as already mentioned above. From an EU law 
standpoint, however, a complete prohibition of inbound reincorporations violates freedom of 
establishment as interpreted by the Court of Justice in the VALE ruling.  
The State of origin, where the company is incorporated at the moment when the decision is 
taken, is also normally competent to determine the relevant substantive and procedural require-
ments (such as majorities for approving the reincorporation decision). Nevertheless, we cannot 
exclude that the State of arrival also seeks to regulate substantive law issues. In any case, the 
State of arrival is certainly competent to regulate the registration procedure. In other words, the 
question arises of which procedural steps immigrating companies should follow to register in 
the company register as the continuation of an already existing company instead of a newly 
founded one. 
 
5.2. Comparative analysis 
Our findings indicate that, in practice, Member States still follow different solutions regarding 
inbound reincorporations, despite the decisions of the Court of Justice in VALE. In most cases, 
rules on inbound reincorporations reflect those on outbound transactions, but we shall see that 
exceptions exist. Member States can be classified along the same dimensions that were adopted 
for outbound reincorporations, according to whether (a) inbound conversions are statutorily 
allowed and regulated, (b) inbound conversions are not allowed or practically impossible, or 
(c) inbound reincorporations are not explicitly regulated, the consequences of the lack of reg-
ulation are still unclear, yet scholars and court are increasingly of the opinion that companies 
                                                 
121 See Smart (n 97) 126. 
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incorporated in another EEA country should be allowed to reincorporate as domestic compa-
nies, despite the lack of rules. The classification of Member States in these groups largely, 
although not entirely, mirrors the classification related to voluntary outbound reincorporations 
(a) Jurisdictions that allow and regulate inbound reincorporations  
While some countries allow inbound reincorporations without regulating the procedural and 
substantive rules of this transaction (Belgium and Portugal), other jurisdictions have explicitly 
allowed and regulated inbound reincorporations in the same legislative instrument that governs 
outbound reincorporations (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Malta and Spain). In particular, 
inbound reincorporations are feasible only if the country of origin allows domestic companies 
to reincorporate abroad and if the immigrating company has complied with both substantive 
requirements and private international law provisions of that country. Therefore, commercial 
registers will enter an incoming company only if it has complied with the relevant laws of both 
the country of origin and the country of arrival. In some jurisdictions, a notary statement (Czech 
Republic)122, a statement of the competent authority (Denmark)123 or a specific declaration of 
the immigrating companies (Cyprus)124 must be attached to the filing with the local register 
attesting that the relocation complies with the law of the country of origin. Additionally, under 
Spanish legislation, in order to protect creditors of the incoming company, an independent ex-
pert should state that the net value of assets is at least equal to the Spanish minimum capital 
requirements (this provision is applicable to both EEA and non-EEA countries).125  
Another issue that needs to be addressed in proceedings for inbound reincorporations is the 
cancellation from the commercial register of the country of origin. As we have seen above 
regarding outbound reincorporations126, according to both the SE Regulation and the Cross-
Border Merger Regulation, the ‘emigrating’ company can be cancelled from the original reg-
ister only after its registration in the country of arrival. After registration and before cancella-
tion, therefore, the company is registered in two registers at the same time. From the viewpoint 
of the State of arrival, the question arises as to whether a domestic authority should send a 
statement of registration to the commercial register of the country of departure and whether it 
should check that the company is cancelled from the register of the original country. Cypriot, 
Maltese and Danish regimes deal with these issues. In Cyprus and Malta, an ‘immigrating 
company’ is registered only temporarily, and is required to submit evidence of its removal from 
the companies register of origin within 6 months; only after this submission can the (final) 
certificate of continuation be issued.127 In Denmark, the local register (DBA) should send a 
                                                 
122 The notary attests to the satisfaction of the requirements of Czech law for registration in the commercial register 
and to having seen the instrument issued by the competent authority of the country of origin, proving compliance 
with the requirements of that law for the cross-border conversion of the legal form. See Czech Transformation 
Act, s. 59z and s. 384d 
123 Danish Companies Act, s. 318n. 
124 The Companies Law Cap. 113, art. 354C. 
125 Structural Modification of Companies Act 3/2009, art. 94. 
126 See section 3.1, above. 
127 For Cyprus: The Companies Law Cap. 113, art. 354G. For Malta: Continuation of Companies Regulation 2002, 
s. 6. 
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statement to the authority of the State of origin, attesting that the company was registered as a 
Danish company.128 
(b) Jurisdictions in which inbound reincorporations are either not allowed or are practi-
cally impossible 
Other Member States have not adopted legislation on inbound reincorporations and, as a matter 
of practice, inbound reincorporations remain either impossible or excessively difficult (Bul-
garia, Croatia, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania and the UK). These countries, additionally, 
do not distinguish EEA from non-EEA companies. This policy option normally mirrors the ban 
on ‘outbound reincorporations’ in the same country and is either based on general private in-
ternational law criteria (Ireland and the UK) or lack of regulation (Bulgaria and Romania). For 
instance, Romanian legislation does not mention inbound reincorporations, and a court of ap-
peal decision from 2008, concerning the attempt of an Italian company to re-incorporate as a 
Romanian entity, held that these transactions were not allowed.129 However, this issue is con-
troversial and legal scholars argue that EEA companies should be allowed to reincorporate 
under Romanian law without liquidating and that domestic law should be reformed in order to 
comply with the VALE decision.130 Given that these countries provide for the possibility of a 
domestic company to convert into another type of business organisation, the restrictive ap-
proach of the countries in this group is in breach of the freedom of establishment, as interpreted 
in VALE, if it continues to be applied to foreign companies incorporated in the EEA.131  
(c) Jurisdictions that do not explicitly regulate voluntary inbound reincorporations  
In several other Member States where inbound reincorporations are not regulated, the interpre-
tation of domestic law might be uncertain, ranging from countries that accept inbound reincor-
porations by applying case law of the Court of Justice to countries in which this issue is unclear 
or has not yet been addressed. In all of these countries, however, scholars and courts show, 
albeit to different degrees, an increasing awareness of the impact of the Court’s decisions on 
inbound reincorporations.  
In Austria and Germany, case law has recently started accepting that inbound reincorporations 
should be allowed despite the lack of legislation. In Austria, the Supreme Court has recently 
clarified that inbound reincorporations from other Member States are possible and that rules 
on domestic conversions should be applied.132 Additionally, in light of Austrian private inter-
national law, the ‘immigrating’ company must also relocate its headquarters onto the Austrian 
territory. In Germany, a recent judicial decision has maintained that inbound reincorporations 
                                                 
128 Danish Companies Act s. 318n. 
129 Court of Appeal Bucarest No 1060/2008. 
130 M Şandru, ‘Libertatea de stabilire a societăţilor comerciale. Posibile efecte ale cauzei VALE, C-378/10, 
pendinte, asupra practicii instanţelor române’ (2012) Revista Rômana de Drept European 124. 
131 P Davies and S. Worthington, Gower Principles of Modern Company Law (Sweet and Maxwell 10th edn, 
2016) 142. 
132 See OGH, judgment of 1 August 2014, 6 Ob 224/13d.  
26 
 
are to be allowed and that rules on national conversions should be applied by way of analogy.133 
This approach followed by Austrian and German courts is largely driven by the decisions of 
the Court of Justice in VALE, but some uncertainty still remains regarding which procedure is 
to be followed for reincorporating a foreign company domestically. Finally, in Luxemburg and 
Slovenia, no judicial decision has been issued so far, but legal scholars argue that inbound 
reincorporations should be allowed as a consequence of Cartesio and VALE.134 
The situation is more uncertain in other jurisdictions, although scholars often submit that in-
bound reincorporations are to be made possible by virtue of an application of VALE. In France, 
the lack of statutory regulation still raises uncertainty as to the procedure that foreign compa-
nies have to fulfil in order to re-incorporate as French entities. In Hungary, where ‘outbound 
reincorporations’ are still impossible, inbound reincorporations are considered feasible by ap-
plying the ratio decidendi of the VALE decision (which was related to a company that sought 
to reincorporate in Hungary).135 In Italy, although it is accepted that foreign companies can 
relocate their ‘statutory seat’ onto the domestic territory, provided that both Italian substantive 
rules and the rules of the country of origin are respected,136 it is uncertain whether such a relo-
cation leads to a change of company law.137 In this respect, Italian notaries seem to accept 
inbound reincorporations, mostly so in the aftermath of the VALE decision, provided that the 
incoming company has respected Italian substantial and procedural rules.138 Finally, the Polish 
regime is similar to the Hungarian regime, since legal scholars hold that inbound reincorpora-
tions should be made possible after the VALE decision, whereas, as we have seen above, legal 
scholars are divided regarding outbound reincorporations, which are likely not to be feasible 
and, in any event, require full liquidation of a company’s assets. It is interesting to note, there-
fore, that in both Hungary and Poland the VALE decision is held directly applicable, whereas 
the position in relation to the statement in Cartesio, according to which outbound reincorpora-
tions must also be allowed, is far less clear, probably reflecting the uncertain binding force of 
this part of the Cartesio ruling.  
 
                                                 
133 OLG Nürnberg (2014) Deutsches Steuerrecht 812: a Luxembourgish private company (Sarl) sought to transfer 
its statutory seat, together with its headquarters, to Germany in order to become a German private company 
(GmbH). See Frank (n 105) with further references to previous cases deciding in the negative. 
134 For Luxembourg see A Steichen, Précis de droit des sociétés (Saint-Paul 4th edn, 2014) para. 82. For Slovenia 
see J Prostor, ‘Razdružitev statutarnega in dejanskega sedeža slovenske družbe’ (2014) Pravnik 1-2. 
135 However, the Hungarian Supreme Court, in its task of applying the VALE decision, refused registration of the 
Italian company as a Hungarian entity for lack of compliance with Hungarian law: EH 2013.02.G3. 
136 Italian Private International Law Act, art. 25(3). 
137 See e.g. R Luzzatto and C Azzolini, ‘Società (nazionalità e legge regolatrice)’ in Digesto delle discipline 
privatistiche sezione commerciale (UTET 1997) 136, 153; Damascelli (n 116) 135-6 (relocation in Italy is possible 
without change of company law); Ballarino (n 118) 372 (a relocation of statutory seat may lead to a 
reincorporation as an Italian company); MV Benedettelli, ‘La legge regolatrice delle persone giuridiche dopo la 
riforma del diritto internazionale privato’ (1997) Rivista delle società 39, 98-103 (stressing the necessity to check 
what companies aim at attaining and what is being allowed by the regime of the country of origin). 
138 See www.consiglionotarilemilano.it/documenti-comuni/prassi-registro-imprese/prassi_09.aspx. 
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6. RESTRICTIONS TO REINCORPORATIONS: DISCUSSION OF THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS 
AND A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE 
6.1. Discussion of the comparative analysis 
As a consequence of the analysis conducted hitherto, the question arises of whether obstacles 
placed by national regimes to reincorporations are compatible with the EU freedom of estab-
lishment, as interpreted by the Court of Justice in the cases Cartesio and VALE. With regard to 
outbound voluntary reincorporations of domestic companies, the answer largely depends on 
whether the obiter dictum in Cartesio, according to which obstacles to outbound reincorpora-
tions are to be treated as restrictions to the freedom of establishment, is viewed as the correct 
interpretation of the Treaty. Our findings indicate that several Member States have not brought 
their domestic law in line with the interpretation of the Treaty in Cartesio and still prohibit 
voluntary outbound reincorporations. By contrast, as we have seen above,139 in three countries 
(Austria, Germany and the Netherlands) that formerly prohibited outbound reincorporations, 
the prevailing view among legal scholars is that – even without explicit legislative reform – 
such transactions should now be regarded as being available to domestic companies by virtue 
of the relevant Treaty provisions as interpreted by the Court in Cartesio. Even so, many tech-
nical and procedural questions still remain unclear, as Cartesio does little more than declaring 
that outbound reincorporations constitute an exercise of the freedom of establishment.  
With regard to ‘inbound’ voluntary reincorporations, by contrast, the VALE decision clarified 
that (a) the absence of rules laid down in secondary European Union law is not a precondition 
for the application of the freedom of establishment,140 (b) where equivalent domestic restruc-
turings are permitted, more onerous rules for ‘inbound’ reincorporations require full justifica-
tion, that is to say they should be appropriate for attaining overriding reasons in the public 
interest and must not go beyond what is necessary to attain them,141 and (c) domestic rules of 
the host states should comply with the general principles of equivalence and effectiveness.142 
It is clear that Member States cannot completely prohibit inbound reincorporations or render 
them practically impossible. Nevertheless, as we have seen, several Member States still impede, 
or severely restrict, the possibility of foreign companies to convert into domestic entities. 
Even where reincorporations are generally allowed, their practical availability crucially de-
pends on the applicable procedural rules. In several Member States the procedure is regulated 
insufficiently or is not at all. From a practical perspective, a particularly relevant question con-
cerns the process by which the domestic register of the country of origin deregisters the emi-
grating company. In Member States where this issue is not regulated, there is a significant risk 
that a company is struck off the register of the country of origin without being registered yet in 
any other commercial register and having acquired its status under the law of the destination 
country. As registration is typically a prerequisite for a company possessing legal capacity, 
uncertainty regarding this process – which will require a certain level of cooperation between 
                                                 
139 See section 4.2 (c), above. 
140 VALE (n 43) [38], quoting Sevic [26]. 
141 VALE (n 43) [36] and [39], quoting Sevic [28, 29]. 
142 VALE (n 43) [48]. 
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judicial or administrative authorities across Member State borders – poses a significant risk for 
businesses wishing to reincorporate. The decision rendered in the case Interedil is a telling 
example of this problem:143 an Italian company decided to transfer its statutory seat to London 
and the local register cancelled the company without checking whether the company was reg-
istered in the UK register as a domestic company. Interedil, however, was only registered by 
the UK’s Companies House as an ‘overseas’ company having a ‘place of business’ in UK, not 
least since inbound reincorporations are not currently possible under UK law – notwithstanding 
the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice discussed above. As a consequence, after its cancella-
tion from the Italian register, Interedil was not registered anywhere as a domestic company: 
the Italian register believed that this company had become a UK entity, while its record with 
the Companies House suggested it was still an entity existing under Italian company law. In-
teredil thus shared the fate of VALE Építési kft. 
Some Member States (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Malta and Spain), by contrast, have 
decided to explicitly allow reincorporations and to precisely regulate these transactions. In 
these countries, the proceedings and substantial requirements for reincorporating abroad are 
often similar to those foreseen in cross-border mergers. In particular, companies can be can-
celled from the domestic register only after they prove being registered under a foreign com-
mercial register. 
 
6.2. A new submission for a preliminary ruling from a Polish court 
This article has shown that several Member States restrict or even prohibit cross-border rein-
corporations. This issue is much more relevant regarding voluntary outbound reincorporations 
of domestic companies, due to the need of protecting minority shareholders and creditors from 
the risk that the new company law rules are less protective of their interests. In this respect, the 
Court of Justice held in Cartesio that any restrictions on outbound reincorporations should be 
justified by overriding reasons in the public interest. However, as we have seen above, the 
scope of this holding is still partially unclear. The question of whether the freedom of estab-
lishment includes a right to change the applicable company law without liquidation will be 
addressed by the Court of Justice when it will deliver its judgement on the request for a pre-
liminary ruling submitted by the Polish Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) in February 2016.144 
It is worth, therefore, briefly to summarise the content of the questions submitted to the Court 
of Justice and the related problems. 
The starting point is a decision of a Polish company, Polbud, to relocate its statutory seat to 
Luxembourg and to convert into a Luxemburgish company, under the new name Consoil Ge-
otechnik S.à.r.l.. The Polish Private International Law Act stipulates in Article 19(1) that trans-
fers of companies’ ‘seats’ within the EEA area do not result in the loss of legal personality; the 
                                                 
143 C-396/09 Interedil Srl, in liquidation v Fallimento Interedil Srl and Intesa Gestione Crediti SpA [2011] ECR 
I-9915. See also FM Mucciarelli, ‘The Hidden Voyage of a Dying Italian Company, from the Mediterranean 
Sea to Albion’ (2012) 9 European Company and Financial Law Review 571. 
144 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy (Poland) lodged on 22 February 2016, C-106/16, 
Polbud v Wykonawstwo sp. z.o.o. 
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concept of ‘seat’ is commonly interpreted as a company’s registered office or statutory seat. 
The Polish Commercial Company Act, however, treats a shareholder resolution on relocation 
of the statutory seat akin to a liquidation decision.145 In other words, after a decision to relocate 
its seat abroad, a company would keep its legal personality, but its assets are to be liquidated 
and creditors are to be satisfied. As a consequence, Polbud, after its decision to transfer its 
statutory seat to Luxembourg, formally entered into a liquidation procedure, which was con-
sidered a precondition for a cross-border reincorporation.  
Two years later, the company was entered in the Luxembourgish register under its new name 
and filed an application to be cancelled from the Polish register. The Polish registry court, 
however, refused to cancel Polbud, claiming that it did not provide sufficient evidence of hav-
ing completed the liquidation process.146 Polbud challenged this decision and the case eventu-
ally reached the Polish Supreme Court, which referred three preliminary questions to the Court 
of Justice. In the first place, the Court is asked to clarify whether the freedom of establishment 
precludes a Member State from requiring liquidation of a reincorporating company before it is 
removed from the relevant national register. Secondly, if the first question is answered in the 
negative, the Polish court asks whether such a liquidation requirement could be seen as a jus-
tified restriction in relation to the aim of safeguarding ‘creditors, minority shareholders, and 
employees of the migrant company’. Finally, the Court is required to clarify the concept of 
establishment for the purpose of Article 49 of the Treaty; the reason is that Polbud had declared 
that its commercial activities would remain in Poland, which raises the question as to whether 
a company’s decision to reincorporate without relocating its establishment would fall within 
the scope of Article 49. 
The first two questions are crucial, since the Polish regime does not regulate the procedure of 
cross-border reincorporations, so that creditors may be left unprotected. In this respect, the 
main policy problem seems to be that, while a conversion of a Polish company into another 
Polish entity would require this company to comply with a large number of information and 
protection requirements, companies migrating abroad would be exempted entirely from the 
application of any requirements if the liquidation procedure was not applicable, considering 
that Polish courts refuse to apply the protection mechanisms of domestic conversions to the 
cross-border context by way of analogy.  
Finally, the Court is asked to address the concept of ‘establishment’ for the purpose of applying 
Article 49 and 54 of the Treaty. The decisions VALE and Cadbury Schweppes maintained that 
the concept of establishment ‘involves the actual pursuit of an economic activity through a 
fixed establishment in the host Member State for an indefinite period’, with the consequence 
that the country of arrival can examine whether the incoming company ‘is seeking to establish 
a lasting economic link’ with its territory.147 It is however uncertain whether the same logic 
also applies to the country of emigration. Therefore, the Polish court submitted to the Court of 
                                                 
145 Arts. 270(2) and 459(2) of Commercial Company Act. 
146 See the whole description in Opinion AG Kokott (n 55) [13]-[19]. 
147 C‑196/04 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas [2006] ECR I‑7995, paragraph 54; VALE (n 
43) [34]. 
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Justice the question of whether ‘a situation in which […] a company transfers its registered 
office to another Member State without changing its place of principal establishment, which 
remains in the State of initial incorporation’ falls within the scope of the EU freedom of estab-
lishment.148 The Polish court seems to envisage the possibility that the country of origin is 
given the same authority as the country of arrival. It is clear that the Member State of immi-
gration can refuse the incorporation of a company if it does not pursue any business activity in 
its own territory (provided the same requirement applies to domestic companies). This author-
ity of the state of incorporation was acknowledged as early as Daily Mail, and it is in line with 
the definition of establishment as espoused in VALE and other cases, since the mere act of 
registration of a company arguably does not amount to ‘the pursuit of genuine economic activ-
ity’.149 The referring Polish court now seems to argue that even if the state of immigration al-
lows the registration of the migrating company without any economic activity and the company 
keeps its ‘actual’ or ‘fixed’ establishment in the state of origin, the process of reincorporation 
may fall outside the scope of the right of establishment as no ‘fixed establishment’ is relocated, 
provided the state of origin, were it the immigration state, would refuse to register a company 
that did not pursue any economic activity in that country.150  
In May 2017, Advocate General Kokott issued her opinion in Polbud.151 Rephrasing the ques-
tions and addressing the third question first, she pointed out that it had to be assessed whether 
Polbud’s decision to reincorporate in Luxembourg fell within the scope of the right of estab-
lishment, before it could be asked whether Polish law unnecessarily restricted that freedom.152 
Whether Polbud actually aimed not to relocate any ‘establishment’ to Luxembourg was a 
merely factual question, which was to be decided by the local courts. Regarding the interpre-
tation of EU law, the Advocate General concluded that a cross-border reincorporation without 
any ‘genuine economic activity’ in the country of arrival did not fall within the scope of free-
dom of establishment, with the consequence that the country of origin could block such a de-
cision.153 This interpretation was not seen to be in conflict with Cartesio or Centros. The Ad-
vocate General argued that the former decision could not ‘be taken to mean that the Court 
regarded cross-border conversions as falling within the scope of freedom of establishment ir-
respective of any actual act of establishment’.154 The present case was distinguished from Cen-
tros because the latter did not involve ‘the consecutive application of two national laws’.155 The 
Advocate General, therefore, seems to suggest that in a static case, such as Centros, a genuine 
                                                 
148 Polbud question number 3. 
149 VALE (n 43) [34]. 
150 This seems to be the case under national Polish company law, see A Szajkowski in S Sołtysiński, A Szajkowski, 
A Szumański, and J Szwaja (eds), Kodeks spółek handlowych t. II, Spółka z ograniczoną odpowiedzialnością, 
Komentarz do artykułów 151-300 (C.H. Beck 3rd edn, 2014) 83; A Kidyba, Kodeks spółek handlowych t. I, 
Komentarz do artykułów 1-300 (Wolters Kluwer 9th edn, 2013) 648. 
151 Opinion AG Kokott (n 55). 
152 Opinion AG Kokott (n 55) [25]. 
153 Opinion AG Kokott (n 55) [38]. In a similar vein see Frank (n 105) 65-72 and 146-9. 
154 Opinion AG Kokott (n 55) [40]. 
155 Opinion AG Kokott (n 55) [42].  
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establishment in any Member State is sufficient to invoke the protections of the right of estab-
lishment in that state (Denmark in Centros), whereas in a dynamic case involving a change in 
the applicable law, the establishment must follow the applicable national law.156 
The Opinion then addressed the first two questions, stating that (a) the need to liquidate a com-
pany in order to reincorporate abroad was a restriction of the freedom of establishment,157 and 
(b) such a restriction was neither necessary nor proportionate to protect creditors and minority 
shareholders. 158 Interestingly, the Opinion implicitly suggests that national legislators or, fail-
ing an explicit statutory regulation, national courts by way of analogy may apply less restrictive 
mechanisms to attain the goal of protecting such stakeholders. In this regard, the Opinion ex-
plicitly mentioned that creditors might be given the right to request specific safeguards, simi-
larly to domestic mergers,159 and that minority shareholders could be protected by way of grant-
ing them the right to withdraw their participation from the company.160 
For the purpose of this article, it is to be stressed that, even in the wake of a final decision of 
the Court clarifying that the freedom of establishment also protects voluntary outbound rein-
corporations, the ‘law in action’ of Member States would not, as such, necessarily change, and 
certain jurisdictions might continue not to provide any specific procedure for implementing 
cross-border reincorporations in a detailed and interoperable way, with the consequence that 
these operations may well remain impracticable in many Member States. A possible solution 
could be for national courts to apply by analogy – guided by principles stated in the European 
case law – the harmonised procedural and substantive rules for cross-border mergers or trans-
fers of registered offices of SEs. Yet, no one can be certain that such interpretation is going to 
be widely accepted by national courts and authorities, which may well face constraints on their 
ability to create ad hoc a procedural framework for reincorporations, based only on the fact 
that these operations fall within the scope of the freedom of establishment. This is a situation 
that several Member States already experience regarding inbound reincorporations, as we have 
seen in the former sections, and we can expect the same will happen regarding outbound rein-
corporations, for which political problems are even more pronounced. In these countries, there-
fore, two different issues would emerge. On the one hand, there is a problem of legal certainty 
as companies would still not be aware of how the procedure for reincorporations would work 
in practice. On the other hand, outbound reincorporations may create risks for creditors and 
other stakeholders and a lack of regulation would simply jeopardise their interests. The conse-
quence is that, in order to make the right to reincorporate effective from the perspective of both 
the country of origin and the country of arrival, a legislative instrument should be in place that 
clarifies the procedure for cancelling a company from the original register and re-registering it 
in the new register and the mechanisms for protecting minorities and creditors. 
 
                                                 
156 This, of course, would constitute a qualification of Centros, since in that case there was no congruence between 
applicable law (English) and genuine establishment (in Denmark). 
157 Opinion AG Kokott (nt. 55) [48]. 
158 Opinion AG Kokott (n 55) [66]. 
159 Opinion AG Kokott (n 55) [60]. 
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6.3. The essential elements of a future directive 
Reincorporations from one jurisdiction to another can only be implemented when procedural 
and substantive rules are in place in both jurisdictions that make this operation possible. Since 
Member States should implement these rules in a way that accommodates the structure and 
substance of their domestic company laws and national commercial registers, the instrument 
of a directive seems more appropriate for the aim of harmonising rules on reincorporations.161 
Additionally, Member States retain the power to require domestically incorporated companies 
to keep some kind of ‘physical’ connection to their territory, such as their headquarters, their 
activities or administrative offices. Indeed, according the Court of Justice, these requirements 
for domestically incorporated companies fall into what can be labelled a ‘reserved area’ for 
Member States’ legislation.162 A directive on cross-border reincorporation will set a minimum 
standard for protecting minority shareholders, creditors and employees from opportunistic mid-
stream changes of company law.163 To attain these goals, it is suggested that such a directive 
should have the following essential features in order to make cross-border conversions feasible 
and to take into account the interests of all stakeholders. 
First, in order to reincorporate abroad, companies need to be struck off the initial public register 
and entered into the public register of the destination Member State. Thus, companies should 
first decide to ‘relocate’ their statutory seat (or their registered office) to the new jurisdiction. 
This explains why most legislative proposals for a 14th directive and recent resolutions of the 
European Parliament refer to the transfer of a company’s ‘registered office’ or to the need to 
harmonise and clarify rules on the transfer of a company’s ‘seat’.164 Yet, a decision to amend 
the articles of association and to ‘relocate’ the registered office does not trigger per se a rein-
corporation abroad. In order to achieve this effect, a company must also show the intention to 
change the lex societatis and, consequently, must file for cancellation from the original register 
and for registration in the public register of the new country. It seems thus more appropriate 
and clear that a new directive will address any situation in which a company decides, by own 
volition, to change the applicable company regime, rather than just the transfer of companies’ 
                                                 
161 Other academic proposals have addressed cross-border reincorporations, and yet none of them has analytically 
touched upon substantive and procedural issues: (a) Geman commission for private international law (Vorschläge 
und Berichte zur Reform des europäischen und deutschen internationalen Gesellschaftsrechts. Vorgelegt im 
Auftrag der zweiten Kommission des Deutschen Rates für Internationales Privatrecht, Spezialkommission 
Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht, H-J Sonnenberger (ed), Mohr Siebeck, 2007), arts. 2 to 7; (b) The ‘Reflection 
Group on the future of EU company law’, a group of academics from different Member States established in 
December 2010 by the European Commission: Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of Company Law in 
Europe, Brussels, 5 April 2011 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/reflectiongroup_report_en.pdf) at 18; (c) Groupe 
européen de droit international privé (GEDIP) Proposal 2015, www.gedip-egpil.eu/present_eng.html. See also F 
Garcimartín-Alférez, ‘The Law Applicable to Companies in the European Union: A proposal of the European 
Group for Private International Law’ (2016), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2857077.  
162 The Court in Cartesio (n 35) [109] explains that ‘the question whether the company is faced with a restriction 
on the free-dom of establishment, within the meaning of Article [49 TFEU], can arise only if it has been 
established, in the light of the conditions laid down in Article [54 TFEU], that the company actually has a right to 
that freedom’. 
163 See LA Bebchuk, ‘Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate 
Law’ (1992) 105 Harvard Law Review 1437, 1485-91. 
164 See section 3.3, above. 
33 
 
registered office or statutory seat (which is just an element of this transaction). However, it is 
also worth stressing that most EU legislative instruments are implicitly based on the assump-
tion that the registered office (or statutory seat) and the applicable law always coincide.165 Thus, 
it is advisable that a reform avoids diverging interpretations at the national level and any am-
biguities as to the consequences of a decision to relocate a company’s statutory seat on the 
applicable law. 
Regarding the internal decision-making process to implement voluntary outbound reincorpo-
rations, we have seen that in all jurisdictions that allow these operations the ultimate decision 
is for the general meeting of the company’s shareholders.166 A decision to ‘reincorporate’ 
abroad is a fundamental decision, which is reasonable being adopted with at least the same 
quorum and majority needed for amending the articles of association, or for converting a com-
pany into another type of domestic company. Such quorums and majorities are legal safeguards 
for protecting minority shareholders from opportunistic midstream changes of the company 
regime.167 To attain this goal, it is desirable that the new directive establishes a minimum ma-
jority requirement based on votes cast, similarly to the SE Regulation.168 Quorums and major-
ities, however, cannot be more stringent than those applicable to similar domestic transactions. 
Finally, it seems advisable that a mandatory protection of classes of shares is included in the 
new directive. Quorums and supermajorities, however, risk not being sufficient for protecting 
minority shareholders when shareholder ownership is concentrated and the emigrating com-
pany does not face pressures from the capital market.169 In order to address this risk, all Mem-
ber States that statutorily allow outbound reincorporations, with the sole exception of the Czech 
Republic, grant to dissenting shareholders either a right to withdraw their participation or a 
veto power through unanimous vote.170 While a requirement for a unanimous vote would make 
reincorporations impossible and is to be excluded, the question arises of whether the new di-
rective should codify a withdrawal right. On the one hand, withdrawal or appraisal rights are 
elements of company law regimes, and each Member State is likely to be in the best position 
to assess whether minority shareholders of domestically incorporated companies need this type 
                                                 
165 See e.g. First Council Directive 68/151/EEC of 9 March 1968, Directive 2007/37/CE on shareholders’ rights, 
or Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover-bids. 
166 This is also the solution adopted for cross-border mergers (Cross-Border Merger Directive, art. 9), the SE (SE 
Regulation, art. 8(4)) and the European Cooperative Company (Council Regulation (EC) 1435/2003 on the Statute 
for a European Cooperative Society (SCE), art. 7. 
167 Se J Armour, ‘Who should make Corporate Law? EC Legislation versus Regulatory Competition’ (2005) 58 
Current Legal Problems 369, 400. 
168 SE Regulation, art. 8(6) and art. 59: relocations of an SE’s registered office should be approved by at least 2/3 
of votes cast. The Cross-Border Merger Directive, by contrast, only provides that Member States may adopt 
provisions ‘designed to ensure appropriate protection for minority members who have opposed the cross-border 
merger’. Cross-Border Merger Directive, art. 4(2). 
169  TH Tröger, ‘Choice of Jurisdiction in European Corporate Law – Perspectives of European Corporate 
Governance’ (2005) 6 European Business Organisation Law Review 3, 40. 
170  In economic terms, such protection indicates that the country of incorporation aims at protecting each 
shareholder individually through a right to ‘exit’ from the ‘nexus of contracts’ that binds all stakeholders. See 
Lombardo (n 37) 647. 
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of protection.171 On the other hand, one of the policy goals of EU legislation should be avoiding 
opportunistic regulatory arbitrages at the expenses of local weak constituencies, in order to 
create the environment for a well-functioning regulatory competition among national company 
law regimes; therefore, it seems desirable that a directive on reincorporations also increases the 
protection for dissenting shareholders, by including dissenting shareholders’ withdrawal right, 
which is, as we have seen, the common denominator of almost all Member States that statuto-
rily allow reincorporations. However, in order to allow Member States to adjust protection of 
dissenting shareholders to domestic necessities and policy purposes, it seems appropriate to 
allow Member States to opt-out from such a mechanism.  
Protecting pre-existing creditors of the company, as well as other stakeholders, is one of the 
main problems of outbound reincorporations and the main reason why several jurisdictions 
restrict reincorporations.172 Member States that have detailed regulations on cross-border con-
versions also provide for adequate creditor protection mechanisms, mostly based on the right 
to object to the reincorporation. As a first option, the new directive may replicate the solution 
of the SE Regulation173 by stating that Member States should provide for ‘adequate protection’ 
of creditors, without any further specification. This solution is likely to increase the level of 
creditor protection in Member States that do not provide for any mechanisms aimed at attaining 
this goal, but it risks being quite vague and uncertain. It is, therefore, advisable increasing the 
level of creditor protection mechanisms by requiring Member States to grant pre-existing un-
secured creditors at least a right to object to the reincorporation, or, alternatively, to obtain 
adequate security or payment, and that a court should assess whether the reincorporation is 
detrimental to creditors. Creditors, indeed, are the class of stakeholders that risk being jeopard-
ised the most by a cross-border reincorporation, without having any powers to influence such 
a decision (with the sole exception of ‘adjusting’ creditors, such as banks and other big lenders). 
Additionally, in order to avoid opportunistic reincorporations decided after a company’s insol-
vency or in the vicinity of insolvency, a new directive should prohibit reincorporations of com-
panies against which proceedings for liquidation, insolvency or suspension of payments have 
been brought.  
Furthermore, it matters that in some Member States, employees can appoint a certain number 
of members of the supervisory board or of the board of directors (‘codetermination’).174 There-
fore, reincorporations out of these countries risk disenfranchising the employees if the new 
state of incorporation does not have similar mechanisms. To address this risk, the Directive on 
                                                 
171 See Impact Assessment 2007 (n 78) 48 (discouraging harmonisation of shareholders’ protections). In this 
regard, see also M Siems, ‘The Case Against Harmonisation of Shareholder Rights’ (2005) 6 European Business 
Organization Law Review 539. 
172 According to the SE Regulation, the Member State of original incorporation should provide for adequate 
protection, while the Cross-Border Merger Directive implicitly refers to the Third Directive on domestic mergers, 
according to which Member States should provide ‘adequate safeguards where the financial situation of the 
merging companies makes such protection necessary and where those creditors do not already have such 
safeguards’. Additionally, the SE Regulation and the SCE Regulation do not allow relocations of a company’s 
registered office abroad if proceedings for ‘winding-up, liquidation, insolvency or suspension of payments or 
other similar proceedings’ have been brought. SE Regulation, art. 8(15) and SCE Regulation, art. 7(15). 
173 SE Regulation, art. 8(7). 
174 For an overview of employee participation regimes see www.worker-participation.eu. 
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employee involvement accompanying the European Company (SE) Statute and the Cross-Bor-
der Mergers Directive175 establish mandatory legal frameworks aimed at protecting existing 
employee participation arrangements. A new directive, therefore, should consider applying 
those mechanisms to reincorporations as well. 
Finally, a new directive should address procedural requirements for companies wishing to re-
incorporate, which are often uncertain under the national laws of the Member States involved. 
The main procedural problem arising for reincorporations is the coordination of actions taken 
by the relevant companies registers, as legal personality is typically tied to registration. The 
risk exists that the company register of the country of origin strikes off a company before it 
‘reappears’ in the destination country. In this respect, the SE Regulation, the SCE Regulation 
and the Cross-Border Merger Directive stipulate that (a) Member States should designate a 
court, notary or other authority, which shall scrutinise the legality of the transaction and issue 
a certificate attesting the completion of acts and formalities to be accomplished in the country 
or origin; (b) this certificate should be submitted to (i) the commercial register of the new 
registered office of an SE or SCE, or (ii) the court, notary or authority designated by the Mem-
ber State of the company resulting from a cross-border merger; (c) the new registration, or the 
registration of the company resulting from a cross-border merger, may not be affected until 
this certificate has been submitted; (d) when the new registration has been affected, the registry 
shall notify the commercial register of the jurisdiction of origin, or of the jurisdiction where 
the companies entering into a cross-border merger are registered; (e) a company can be deleted 
from the commercial register of the original country only after its name is entered in the com-
mercial register of the new Member State, or the company resulting from a cross-border merger 
is registered in the Member State where its registered office is situated.176 It is suggested that 
a solution for regulating cross-border reincorporations should replicate these rules.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
In this article, we have analysed one of the most relevant and unresolved issues related to the 
EU’s freedom of establishment, namely whether companies formed under the law of a Member 
State can decide to reincorporate under a different jurisdiction without liquidation. In this re-
spect, we clarified that the common term ‘corporate mobility’ risks being misleading, since 
productive factors or a company’s headquarters might continue being located in the country of 
origin. A cross-border reincorporation only aims at changing the State having law-making 
power over ‘company law’ issues, namely primarily, though not exclusively, a company’s in-
ternal affairs. It goes without saying that if the country of the original incorporation protects 
creditors and other stakeholders through ‘company law’ rules, a decision of reincorporating 
abroad is politically very contentious. This explains why several Member States prohibit or 
                                                 
175 Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001, supplementing the SE Regulation, art. 4(4). The same 
mechanism is to be applied to cross-border mergers, although with some adaptations: recital 13 and art. 16 Cross-
Border Merger Directive. 
176 See section 3.2, above. 
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severely restrict voluntary reincorporations of domestic companies into entities governed by 
the law of other states.  
In this scenario, the question arises as to whether the freedom of establishment also covers a 
right to reincorporate across Member States and, consequently, whether Member States should 
grant domestically incorporated companies the possibility of reincorporating under the law of 
a different jurisdiction and foreign companies the possibility of converting into domestic enti-
ties without liquidation. The answer is still unclear, despite recent decisions of the Court of 
Justice. In particular, as we have seen, the Cartesio ruling of 2008 indicates that Member States 
cannot prohibit cross-border reincorporations when internal conversions are allowed instead. 
Strictly speaking, however, this statement was just obiter dictum, which probably explains why 
many Member State have ignored it.  
Regarding restrictions to inbound reincorporations, the VALE decision maintained that any re-
striction placed by the country of arrival should be proportionate and reasonable. The Court, 
however, also added that the concept of ‘establishment’ refers to the ‘actual pursuit of an eco-
nomic activity through a fixed establishment’, with the consequence that midstream changes of 
company law are protected by the freedom of establishment only when the company also trans-
fers some physical premise into the Member State of arrival and establishes a ‘genuine eco-
nomic activity’ there. Consequently, the VALE decision indicates that EU law does not protect 
‘free choice’ of company law, while Member States are of course free to allow companies to 
reincorporate even though no activity is transferred across the borders. 
Furthermore, this article has engaged in a comparative analysis of all Member States regimes 
regarding outbound and inbound reincorporations. We have described whether and under 
which conditions domestic companies can, in practice, reincorporate abroad and whether for-
eign companies can convert into domestic entities without being previously liquidated. Our 
analysis has shown that, while some Member States have thoroughly regulated cross-border 
reincorporations, most Member States either have not regulated this issue at all, or only provide 
for partial and incomplete rules.  
In those Member States without any explicit rules on reincorporations, or with partial and in-
complete rules, the ‘law on the books’ needs to be supplemented by scholarly interpretations, 
judicial decisions or opinions of notary authorities. In comparative terms, this is an intriguing 
natural experiment for assessing the impact of national legal cultures and mind-sets on the 
construction of domestic legal regimes. For instance, both Austrian and German lawyers argue 
that EU law, after the Cartesio and VALE decisions, mandates Member States to allow cross-
border reincorporations and that, as a consequence, domestic law should be interpreted and 
applied accordingly, even though no explicit provision exists for implementing midstream 
changes of company law. By contrast, in other Member States that likewise have no explicit 
rules on reincorporations, scholars and practitioners either argue that a domestic legislation is 
necessary to make reincorporations possible, or simply ignore this issue.  
As a consequence, from the standpoint of several Member States, outbound and inbound rein-
corporations are, as a matter of fact, not feasible, despite the Cartesio and VALE rulings. This 
situation will probably not change even if the Court of Justice should explicitly decide that 
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voluntary outbound reincorporations are covered by the freedom of establishment. This con-
fused situation could give rise to opportunistic reincorporations at the expenses of creditors or 
other stakeholders. As we have seen above analysing the Interedil case,177 when the involved 
Member States do not provide for any reincorporation proceeding, or when their rules are con-
fused, companies might be cancelled from the commercial register of the country of origin 
without being entered in any register of other Member States.  
Based on this comparative analysis, we have argued in favour of EU harmonisation of rules 
and proceedings on reincorporations. At the same time, this directive should not harmonise 
private international law criterions and should leave Member States free to require domestically 
incorporated companies to keep some kind of ‘physical’ connection to their territory. Thus, a 
new directive should concern the procedural requirements that domestic companies should 
meet when they decide to reincorporate under a different jurisdiction or when foreign compa-
nies aim at converting into a domestic entity. Additionally, since outbound reincorporations 
might jeopardise creditors, minority shareholders and other stakeholders (such as workers 
when the country of origin follows some form of codetermination), the new directive should 
provide for a minimum harmonisation of mechanisms aimed at protecting these categories of 
company’s stakeholders. In this respect, although it is reasonable that such harmonisation effort 
would only set minimum requirements, we also argued that Member States should not be en-
tirely free to decide on the content of these protection mechanisms.  
A common set of substantive and procedural rules on cross-border reincorporations has become 
a necessity in the EU. On the one hand, several Member States ban reincorporations or make 
them impossible, regardless of the case law of the Court of Justice, thus highlighting a severe 
mismatch between national regimes and EU law. On the other hand, other Member States allow 
domestically incorporated companies to change the applicable company law without liquida-
tion, but only few of these jurisdictions provide for clear rules for protecting stakeholders and 
avoiding the risk that ‘emigrating’ companies disappear from any commercial register of the 
EU. In this confused situation, creditors and other stakeholders suffer widespread risks of being 
damaged through opportunistic reincorporations or through relocations of registered office 
without a real intention of reincorporating abroad. In this scenario, without clear and common 
rules, which take into account the interests of all constituencies and address all procedural is-
sues raised by decisions of reincorporating abroad, Member States will have good reasons for 
increasingly closing their borders and rejecting companies’ mobility.  
 
 
                                                 
177 See section 6.1, above. 
